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Abstract
This report covers the regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2001. Its submission to the
Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. The regulatory control of nuclear
safety focused on the operation of Finnish nuclear facilities as well as on nuclear waste
management and nuclear materials.
No event at nuclear power plants endangered the safe use of nuclear energy. No event at
the FiR 1 research reactor was significant either. The doses of all nuclear power plant
workers were below the individual dose limit. The collective occupational dose was low
internationally. Radioactive releases were low and the dose calculated on their basis for
the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants
was well below the limit established by the Government. In addition, the occupational
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the environment from the research reactor
were well below set limits.
The regulatory control of nuclear waste management focused on spent fuel storage and
plans for final disposal as well as on the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor
waste. No events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered
safety. Nuclear material safeguards verified the use of nuclear materials in accordance
with current regulations and the whereabouts of every batch of nuclear material.
The regulatory control verified that the operation of Finnish nuclear power plants, nuclear
waste management and the use of nuclear materials complied with he current rules and
regulations. In addition, STUK verified that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear
damage has been taken care of according to legislation.
International co-operation continued, with financing from STUK’s budget and external
sources. Externally financed co-operation focused on the improvement of safety and
radiation protection at Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants as well as on the devel-
opment of nuclear material control systems in Ukraine, the Baltic Countries and Russia.
The total costs of the regulation of nuclear safety in 2001 were FIM 42.7 million (7.2 M€).
The total costs of operations subject to a charge were FIM 34.5 million (5.8 M€), the full
amount of which was charged to the licensees and licence-applicants.
TOSSAVAINEN Kirsti (ed.). Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2001.
STUK-B-YTO 216. Helsinki 2002. 43 pp. + Appendices 22 pp.
Avainsanat: nuclear energy, nuclear facility, nuclear waste, regulatory control
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The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in Fin-
land as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/
1987). STUK’s responsibilities include control of
physical protection, emergency planning and the
use of nuclear energy to prevent nuclear prolifera-
tion. This is a report on the regulatory control in
the field of nuclear energy, submitted by STUK to
the Ministry of Trade and Industry once a year, as
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy
Decree.
It covers the regulatory control of nuclear facil-
ities, nuclear waste management and nuclear ma-
terials by the STUK Departments of Nuclear
Waste and Materials Regulation (YMO) and Nu-
clear Reactor Regulation (YTO).
The report describes the regulatory control of
nuclear facilities dealing with plant operation and
operational events as well as safety improve-
ments. The results of probabilistic safety analyses
are given as well as worker radiation doses and
collective doses, release data and the results of
1 Preface
environmental radiation monitoring.
The nuclear waste management section dis-
cusses the final disposal of nuclear fuel and reac-
tor waste treatment. It gives the end-of-year vol-
umes of nuclear fuel and of reactor waste stored
onsite.
Nuclear material safeguards at Finnish nucle-
ar facilities are described as well as regulatory
control of radioactive materials transport.
The report includes statistics on i.a. the distri-
bution of working time between various tasks, the
number of inspection days at the nuclear power
plants and component manufacturers’ premises as
well as the number and processing time of re-
viewed documents.
In addition, the report includes preparation of
regulations and some supportive functions, such
as safety research, emergency preparedness, com-
munication and development projects. Participa-
tion in international co-operation in the field of
nuclear safety is described as well.
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2.1 Resources
The regulatory control of nuclear safety mostly
focused on the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant
units owned by Fortum Power and Heat Oy and
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy as well as on their nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear materials. The planning and
later implementation of the final disposal of nucle-
ar fuel, which is part of nuclear waste manage-
ment, is taken care of by Posiva Oy. Subject to the
regulatory control were also the research reactor
operated by the Technical Research Centre of Fin-
land, small-scale users of nuclear materials as well
as transportation of radioactive materials. This
chapter gives an overall account of the control ex-
ercised by STUK and includes statistics on the
regulatory control. The activities subject to the
regulatory control are described in more detail in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 as well as in Appendices 6 and 7.
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation
included basic operations subject and not subject
to a charge. Basic operations subject to a charge
were comprised of the regulatory control of nucle-
ar facilities, with their costs charged to the licen-
sees. Those basic operations not subject to a charge
included international and domestic co-operation
as well as emergency response and communica-
tions. The basic operations not subject to a charge
are publicly funded. The overheads due rule-mak-
ing and support functions (administration, devel-
opment projects, training, maintenance and devel-
opment of expertise as well as reporting) were
carried forward into the costs of the both types of
the basic operations and of contracted services, in
relation to the number of working hours worked
for spent on each function.
Distribution of working hours at each duty
area is given in Table I.
The time spent on the regulatory control of
2 Regulatory control of nuclear safety
—resources and development
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 11.8 man-years,
which is 14.3 % of the total working time of the
personnel. The time spent on the regulatory con-
trol of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 13.1
man-years, i.e. 13.5% of total working time. Be-
sides the regulatory control of the nuclear power
plants these figures include the regulatory control
of nuclear materials. The time spent on the regula-
tory control of the nuclear waste management was
3.0 man-years, i.e.3.7% of total working time. The
regulatory control of the FiR 1 research reactor
took 0.1 man-years and the preparation of a pre-
liminary safety evaluation for a fifth reactor in
planning 0.2 man-years. The regulatory contro of
the small-scale users of nuclear materials took
0.02 man-years. Fig 1 gives the distribution of
working time spent on the main functions.
The number of inspection days onsite and at
the component manufacturers’ premises totalled
635. In addition to inspections focused on the
safety of the nuclear power plants, the figure
includes inspections of nuclear waste manage-
ment and nuclear materials. Two resident inspec-
tors worked at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and
one at Loviisa plant. The number of inspection
days over the past years is given in Fig 2.
The total number of documents submitted to
STUK for review in 2001 was 1414. The number of
documents submitted in 2001 and earlier, whose
review was completed, was 1303. The figure in-
cludes the licences granted by STUK in accord-
ance with the Nuclear Energy Act, which are
given in Appendix 2, and the decisions on nuclear
power plant personnel given in Appendix 3. Aver-
age document review time was 58 days. The yearly
number of documents and their average review
times are given in Fig 3. Figs 4 and 5 give the
distribution of review times of documents on Lovi-
isa and Olkiluoto plants. Reports for 21 events at
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Table I. Distribution of working hours at each duty area.
Figure 1. Working time spent on main functions.
Figure 2. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises.
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Figure 3. Number of documents received and reviewed as well as the average document review time.
Figure 4. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Loviisa plant units.
1774
1303141414551237
1268
1463
1274
14811517
55
72
123
50
58
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
0
30
60
90
120
Number of received documents Number of reviewed documents Average document review time (days)
Figure 5. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 6. Number of event reports submitted by Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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Loviisa nuclear power plant and for nine events at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were submitted to
STUK. The number of event reports over the past
years is given in Fig 6. The licensees regularly
submitted to STUK daily reports, quarterly re-
ports, annual reports, outage reports, annual envi-
ronmental radiation safety reports, monthly indi-
vidual radiation dose reports, annual operational
experience feedback reports and safeguards re-
ports.
STUK concluded that the Finnish nuclear pow-
er plants were operated according to valid regula-
tions.
2.2 Development projects
Development of information management
The development of information management re-
lating to nuclear safety regulation was continued.
The focus was on Microsoft’s Share Point Portal
Server (SPS), which was assessed as an applicable
information tool. It’s benefits included complete
integrability with the office applications used in
STUK (the Microsoft Office Family) and its rela-
tively easy manageability using own expertise.
When choosing software for testing SPS’s econom-
ic price and the fact that it would most likely meet
STUK’s data management requirements were not-
ed as well.
SPS testing was discontinued after installation
to test the applicability of a corresponding product
in the SAP product family. Since STUK’s financial
administration already uses SAP software prod-
ucts this was to find out whether a SAP family
product would help meet the same objectives as
SPS, ensuring at the same time integrity with the
software used by financial administration. The
comparison made showed that the objectives of
information management in nuclear safety regula-
tion can be attained even using SAP software
products.
Based on the comparison made, it was decided
to complete the testing of the SPS software in
early 2002 and to participate thereafter in a SAP
software testing at STUK.
In addition to the above software comparisons
and tests, discussions with Fortum Power and
Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy, operators of
the Finnish nuclear power plants, were continued
to establish shared Extranet solutions. In addi-
tion, the development of information management
tools (identification procedures, electronic identifi-
cation card) and associated procedures (electronic
services) in public administration were followed.
Organisational safety culture
In the field of safety culture the focus was in the
development of regulatory work. To evaluate safe-
ty culture, collection of observations from STUK’s
inspectors was commenced. A list of the manifes-
tations of safety culture had been collected to
guide observation, and training was arranged for
inspectors. Further work on the observations will
be within the periodic inspection programme. This
procedure was tested in 2001. The results were
considered beneficial and further development is
going on.
STUK’s aim is to extensively develop safety
culture within the whole of the Finnish nuclear
sector. A strong safety culture means
• awareness of the specific features and proce-
dures of own organisation as well as their
relation to safety objectives
• target-oriented development of own organisa-
tion and its operation as well as interaction
between different organisations to assure safe-
ty, and
• willingness to observe safety-related factors in
management, organisation unit/group rela-
tions, procedures and atmosphere, and to react
to them.
In connection with safety culture evaluation plan-
ning was started to facilitate the handling of or-
ganisational change. By means of research STUK
has striven to provide prerequisites for the devel-
opment of safety culture. Research related to safe-
ty culture assessment has been done since 1999
and the work continues.
Development of own operation
The development of STUK’s own work focused on
the completion of old projects. The project to devel-
op organisational culture, started in 1999, yielded
a wealth of ideas for whose implementation per-
sons were chosen and time schedules set up.
12
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 1 6
A Balanced Score Card (BSC) project was
launched and strategic success factors were de-
fined. To improve the BSC indicators STUK has
participated in national and international co-oper-
ation for measurement of the effectiveness of reg-
ulatory activities.
In 2001 the EFQM criteria (European Founda-
tion for Quality Management Excellence Model)
were introduced as a self-assessment tool. On the
basis of an evaluation, a decision was made in
2002 to carry out competence analyses in prepara-
tion of a personnel plan and to continue improve-
ment of working culture. Maintenance and devel-
opment of the quality management system contin-
ued in 2001 based on earlier lines of policy.
As a development project derived from the
strategy of nuclear safety control, the modified
organisation of the department of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation was prepared in autumn 2001 and
implemented at the beginning of 2002.
Figure 7. Regulatory control of nuclear safety income and costs.
2.3 Finances
In 2001, the costs of the regulatory control of nu-
clear safety subject to a charge were FIM 34.5
million (5.8  M€). The total costs of nuclear safety
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million (2.5 M€) came from the regulatory control
of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants,
respectively. The regulatory control of Posiva Oy’s
operations yielded FIM 4.7 million (0.8 M€). The
income from other objects of the regulatory control
(i.a. regulatory control of the FiR 1 research reac-
tor, preparation of a preliminary safety evaluation
for the fifth reactor in planning, regulatory control
of small-scale users of nuclear materials) was FIM
0.4 million (0.07 M€). Figure 7 gives the annual
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nuclear safety over the recent years.
31.9
28
30.2 31.2
34.5
31.5
27.8
30.1 31.1
34.535.9
32
36.4
38.8
42.7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
FI
M
 M
illi
on
Regulatory control income
Costs of regulatory control subject to a charge
Regulatory control total costs
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 1 6
13
The need to update the Government Resolutions
(395), (396) and (397) on general regulations for
the safety of nuclear power plants, and on the
plants’ physical protection and emergency prepar-
edness was assessed. The resolutions originate in
1991. The assessment showed a need for updating.
Since only minor checks in content would be re-
quired, not large basic alterations, updating is not
considered urgent.
No significant amendments to the Nuclear En-
ergy Act or Decree were prepared by STUK and no
such amendments entered into force in Finland in
2001.
STUK publishes YVL guides that are detailed
safety regulations for nuclear facilities. The guides
describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as well.
STUK decides, case by case, how new guides apply
to facilities already in operation and what is the
guides’ degree of obligation in each case. The
issuing of YVL guides is based on the Nuclear
Energy Act (990/1987) and the Government Reso-
lution (395/1991) on the general safety regulations
for nuclear power plants. The revision and updat-
ing of the YVL guides was continued. About 50
guides were prepared or assessed in 2001. By the
end of the year, three guides were completed and
four were in the process of being approved. In
addition, drafts of several guides were well into
completion.
The number of guides published in Finnish is
given in Fig 8. Two were published in English.
Translation into Swedish was started.
YVL guides and other essential nuclear safety
regulations have been available through STUK’s
network for a few years already. In 2001 this
3 Regulatory guides
Figure 8. Number of published YVL guides.
software application, “Ydintieto” (Nucinfo), was
converted to a format accessible by a web browser
and was integrated with STUK’s Intranet.
STUK prepared to the IAEA national state-
ments on 12 draft safety guides that are listed in
Appendix 3.
A self-assessment of the Finnish nuclear safety
regulations, launched in 2000, was complemented
with an external study commissioned to the Tech-
nical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), focusing
on the domestic guides’ degree of prescriptive
guidance and their coverage. The study mapped
the opinions and experiences of licensee repre-
sentatives to sketch a picture of the prescriptive
nature of the Finnish regulations potentially con-
sidered harmful. The study concluded that the
guides’ degree of detail is not harmful. In addition,
objects of development were identified, e.g. assur-
ance of the consistent interpretation of regula-
tions. On the basis of these two assessments,
STUK’s new regulatory guide strategy was
sketched in 2001. In addition, the results were
submitted to the international community in the
form of a second report under the Nuclear Safety
Convention.
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4.1 Regulatory control of nuclear safety
The regulatory control of nuclear safety of the nu-
clear power plants included periodic inspections
and inspections the licensee was obliged to sepa-
rately request during measures carried out at the
facility, or that were conducted by STUK at its
discretion. In addition, the safety of nuclear power
plants was assessed by STUK on the basis of i.a.
operating experience, safety analyses as well as
reports and plans submitted by the licensee, and
by inspections onsite and at component manufac-
turers’ premises.
Inspections in the periodic inspection pro-
gramme are listed in Appendix 1. Inspections in
accordance with the programme are, as a rule,
repeated every year; however, the contents of
individual inspections may change year by year.
The annually inspection programme is brought to
the knowledge of the licensee at the beginning of
every year and inspection days are agreed upon
with the licensee. In 2001 there were 16 inspec-
tions at Loviisa plant and 15 at Olkiluoto plant.
The plant’s management and procedures, the func-
tion of its organisational units and the technical
acceptability of its systems were looked into. The
inspections comprised personnel interviews and
walk rounds to verify facts and oversee tests,
among others. As part of the programme, one
unannounced inspection was conducted at Loviisa
plant. Focus was on work permit procedures prior
to and during an annual maintenance outage.
A total of 87 remarks were issued in the 2001
inspections. Of those given to Loviisa plant, the
most significant for safety were about shortcom-
ings in the management of plant modifications, in
the procurement and quality control of electrical
and I & C equipment and in the monitoring of
steam generator loads. Correspondingly, the most
significant remarks to Olkiluoto plant were about
shortcomings in the management of plant modifi-
cations and the monitoring and evaluation of the
periodic inspection programme. Additionally at
Olkiluoto plant, specific attention was paid to the
utilisation of failure statistics in the assessment
and improvement of plant safety. Loviisa and
Olkiluoto plants will act upon the remarks, and
they already have, to correct the situation. None of
STUK’s observations would have essentially af-
fected plant safety.
STUK controlled the implementation of compo-
nent and structural modifications by inspections
onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises
and by means of licensee reports. Modifications to
improve plant safety are described in subsections
4.2.4 and 4.3.4 as well as in Appendix 7. The
regulatory control of modifications comprised of
the identification of their need, the definition of
the scope of required regulatory attention, the
reviewing of relevant documents as well as the
monitoring of implementation and commissioning.
In consequence of the modifications several docu-
ments on plant operation and layout, such as the
Technical Specifications, the Final Safety Analysis
Report and procedures were revised. The revisions
were reviewed by STUK. One part of the regulato-
ry control  were meetings arranged between STUK
and the licensee. In the meetings licensee’s repre-
sentatives clarified planned modifications and the
status of ongoing modification projects. STUK has
set up an independent data base for plant modifi-
cations monitoring.
During annual maintenance outages regulato-
ry control focused on, among others, the adminis-
tration of work during the outages, the activities
of the operating and maintenance personnel, refu-
elling, inspections and tests by the licensee and
4 Regulatory control of nuclear facilites
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subcontractors as well as radiation protection.
STUK supervised the shutdown of the plant units
and their startup after the outages. The outages
are described in more detail in Appendix 5.
One form of the regulatory control was event
investigation. STUK appoints a team to investi-
gate a plant event especially when the licensee’s
organisation has not operated as planned or when
an event is assessed to lead to significant modifi-
cations in the plant or its procedures. In addition,
a STUK investigation team is set up if the licensee
has not investigated an event’s root causes well
enough.
The licensees assess their plant events, taking
action, if necessary. STUK assesses these licensee
measures as part of the regulatory control. STUK
assesses also its own activities in connection with
the events. STUK did not initiate any new event
investigations in 2001. Two in 2000 initiated in-
vestigations were completed. These investigations
were “Non-compliances with the Technical Specifi-
cations and human-based common cause failures”
and “Delays and deficiencies in implementing of a
risk reducing modification at Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant”. Measures taken in 2001 on account of
the investigations are described in subsections
4.2.3 and 4.3.3.
The Nuclear Energy Act prescribes that STUK
is responsible for verifying that a operator’s liabil-
ity in case of nuclear damage complies with statu-
tory requirements. The Insurance Supervision Au-
thority reviews the contents of liability arrange-
ments. The control procedure is explained in detail
in Guide YVL 1.16 “Control of nuclear liability
insurance policies”. Licensees have submitted the
necessary documents to STUK according to a
procedure set forth in the guide. STUK verified
that the arrangements comply with the relevant
stipulations.
4.2 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.2.1 Operation and operational events
Both units of Loviisa nuclear power plant operat-
ed reliably. The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 92.1%
and that of Loviisa 2 was 89.0%. The duration of
the annual maintenance outages was 20 days at
Loviisa 1 and 22 days at Loviisa 2. The course of
the outages and the actions taken are described in
Appendix 5.
One reactor scram occurred at Loviisa 1. The
cutting of a live cable caused a short circuit in
consequence of which containment isolation
valves, among others, closed. The operator noticed
this and manually tripped the reactor. The event
is described in more detail in Appendix 6. There
was also a brief production break at Loviisa 1 to
check the steam generator space after a lubricat-
ing oil leak from a primary coolant pump motor.
Besides the annual maintenance outage there
were no other production breaks at Loviisa 1. In
addition to the annual maintenance outage, Lovii-
sa 2 was briefly brought to shutdown state for
control rod drive shroud repairs. Production losses
due to component malfunctions were 0.7% at Lo-
viisa 1 and 0.7% at Loviisa 2.
Figure 9 gives the daily average gross powers
of the plant units in 2001. Load factors and the
number of reactor scrams over the past years are
given in Figures 10 and 11.
No safety-significant events occurred at the
Loviisa plant units. The most significant events,
none of which were above INES Level 0, are
described in Appendix 6. The total number of
INES Level 1 and above events at Finnish nuclear
power plants over the past years is given in
Fig 12.
4.2.2 Non-compliances with the Technical
Specifications
At the Loviisa plant units the following three
events were in non-compliance with the Technical
Specifications:
• Ventilation system of Loviisa 1 diesel generator
room partially inoperable
• Control rods were inserted deeper into the
Loviisa 1 reactor core than allowed by the
Technical Specifications
• A position switch of a containment underpres-
sure valve was inoperable at Loviisa 1.
Detailed descriptions are given in Appendix 6.
The licensee has planned, and already partly
implemented, measures to prevent recurrence.
The number of non-compliance with the Technical
Specifications over the past years is given in
16
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Figure 9. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2001.
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Figure 10. Load factors of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units.
Figure 11. Number of reacator scrams at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto units, scram test excluded
(reactor power exceeds 5%).
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Fig 13. Olkiluoto events are discussed in subsec-
tion 4.3.2.
The licensee also applied in advance for STUK’s
approval to exempt from the Technical Specifica-
tions. In 2001 STUK granted three such exemp-
tions for the Loviisa plant units. The yearly
number of exemptions is given in Fig. 14.
4.2.3 Event investigation
Non-compliances with the Technical
Specifications
Investigation of non-compliances with the Techni-
cal Specifications looked into underlying common
factors as well as into the possible causes of their
increase. It was conducted in 2000 and concerned
both Loviisa and Olkiluoto facilities. Annual Re-
port 2000 (STUK-B-YTO 208) discusses the inves-
tigation and Annual Report 1999 (STUK-B-
YTO 202) events which lead to the investigation.
Based on the investigation, STUK recommend-
ed that the licensees re-evaluate their procedures
for recognising changed situations and for taking
into account change impact in sufficient scope in
re-planning and re-schedulling. They should also
find out how to reduce excessive routine in their
work. Alertness of action should be fostered, espe-
cially when pressed for time and during abnormal
situations. These matters should be emphasised in
Figure 12. Events at INES Level 1 and above at the four Finnish plant units.
training as well. In their event investigations, the
licensees should more pay attention than before to
the observation and elimination of human error
and should include their observations in event
reports as well.
Loviisa power plant made an action plan on
account of the above recommendations. STUK
follows the status and implementation of the
projects,  improvements and development needs
as part of the periodic inspection programme. The
number of events in non-compliance with the
Teachnical Specifications has decreased at Loviisa
plant.
Measures concerning Olkiluoto facility are de-
scribed in subsection 4.3.3.
Delays and deficiencies in implementing of
a risk reducing modification at Loviisa
nuclear power plant
The delay of a modification assuring sealing water
supply to the primary coolant pumps of Loviisa
nuclear power plant was looked into. Pump shaft
sealing and sealing water cooling require water.
The modification’s implementation at Loviisa 2
was due in the 2000 annual maintenance outage.
Loviisa plant had decided the matter in July 1999.
The modification was not made, however, because
related utility design documentation was insuffi-
cient and belated. Handling at STUK was behind
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Figure 13. Number of plant events in non-compliance with the Technical Specifications at Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Figure 14. Number of exemptions from the Technical Specifications at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear
power plants.
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schedule as well and an approval could not be
completed in time for the work to be done during
the planned annual maintenance outage. Investi-
gation into the matter is explained in Annual Re-
port 2000 (STUK-B-YTO 208).
Deficiencies in the pre-inspection documenta-
tion submitted to STUK included lacking compo-
nent-level pre-inspection documents of safety-im-
portant sensors and ambiguous I & C equipment
design criteria. The licensee’s decision to submit
insufficient documentation was partly due to the
postponement of the commencement of I & C
equipment and component design close to planned
installation date. In addition, the submitted docu-
ments did not present or justify the deviations
made from the YVL guides, which hampered
STUK’s review of the documents.
Handling of the document by STUK was delayed
mostly because of insufficient inter-unit communi-
cation due to which the modification’s importance
was not recognised widely enough. In its early
stages the modification had been discussed at de-
partmental meetings but this did not prevent the
delay. At the time of the event’s progress, STUK
did not yet concentratedly manage modification
entities.
The modification was implemented at both
Loviisa plant units in the 2001 annual mainte-
nance outages (see 4.2.4 and Appendix 7). The
development needs observed in STUK’s operation
have been taken into account in instructions (i.a.
document handling and modification manage-
ment) of STUK’s Quality Manual.
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4.2.4 Safety improvements
Safety improvements were continued at both plant
units. They were based on new safety require-
ments in YVL guides set forth after the plants’
commissioning, on results of the probabilistic safe-
ty analysis and, partly, on operational experiences.
Loviisa 1 and, to some extent, Loviisa 2, contin-
ued improvements for severe accident manage-
ment planning. Modifications focused on the as-
surance of reactor pressure vessel external cooling
in a core melt situation following a severe acci-
dent. At Loviisa 2 the reactor pit was prepared for
external core cooling. In addition, systems for the
management of hydrogen generated during acci-
dents were improved. Hydrogen flow from reactor
building lower plenum, to ice condensers, to upper
plenum was assured by the installation of devices
opening the lower doors of the ice condensers
during a severe accident. A control room for severe
accident management was commissioned at Lovii-
sa 1.
The operational parameters of pressurised
emergency water tanks were changed in connec-
tion with emergency cooling system modifications
to improve the plant units’ accident behaviour.
Owing to this, fuel cladding temperatures in
worst-case accidents (a primary circuit large leak)
will be essentially lower than before. The raising
of fuel maximum burnup by 12.5% could be conse-
quently accepted. Because of this change the fuel
can be used in the reactor longer than before,
reducing the volume of high-level active waste.
On the basis of the results of probabilistic
analyses improvements were required in the pri-
mary pump coolant sealing water system. The
modification was implemented at both plant units
such that the cooling of primary coolant pump
sealings was assured by a change-over taking
place on the basis of sealing water temperature,
using pumps of the primary make-up system cir-
cuit. This assures the system operation in tran-
sients and accidents.
To reduce the risk of containment external
leaks, an isolation valve was installed in the
reactor building drainage system and the connec-
tion between the reactor building venting system
and outlet line was removed.
In addition, some modifications based on oper-
ational experiences were made at the plant units.
These included a renewal of the fire detection
system and hydrogen units at both plant units as
well as of service water system pump motors at
Loviisa 2. Recoating of the steam generator room
floor was started at Loviisa 1.
Safety improvements are described in Appen-
dix 7.
4.2.5 Probabilistic safety analyses
The licensee complemented probabilistic safety
analysis by a study assessing the risk from leaks
from the primary circuit bypassing the contain-
ment via various systems (VLOCA). Leaks postu-
lated in the analysis exceed 5kg/s. According to the
analysis, leaks from the heat exchangers of the
primary coolant sealing water system and pipe
breaks external to the containment would lead to
a temperature increase in the reactor building
lower plenum. Such an increase could result in the
malfunctioning of measuring transmitters. The
analysis results led to modifications at the plant
units to reduce the risk of VLOCA. Implemented
modifications are described in Appendix 7. Fur-
ther modifications are in the planning for imple-
mentation at a later date.
Another assessment by the licensee concerned
the risk arising from very small leaks from the
primary circuit bypassing the containment (XS-
LOCA). The leak volume would be less than 5kg/s.
Due to their small volume, the emergency core
cooling system is not needed to compensate for the
leaks as is the case with larger leaks. STUK’s
review focused in assessing analysis conclusions
and risk reduction measures. At STUK’s request
the licensee submitted a report on the risk-reduc-
ing measures planned.
The combined VLOCA/XSLOCA core melt risk
frequency, as assessed by the licensee, is ca. 10-4/
year. Several VLOCA/XSLOCA related plant mod-
ifications are due in the 2002 annual maintenance
outage. After their completion, VLOCA/XSLOCA
induced core melt frequency is assessed to be
reduced to ca. a tenth part of the original. Level 1
PSA core melt frequency, all intiating events in-
cluded, would then be ca. 10-4/year. Maximum
Level 2 PSA release frequency would be 6 · 10-6/
year (internal initiating events only). Level 1 PSA
assesses reactor core melt probability and Level 2
PSA the volume, probability and timing of radio-
active releases from the containment.
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4.2.6 Radiation safety
The radiation doses of those who worked at Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant in 2001 were below the 50
mSv annual limit. The distribution of individual
doses in 2001 is given in Table II. The highest
individual dose at Loviisa nuclar power plant was
12.4 mSv. It accumulated during the annual main-
tenance outages.
In addition, individual radiation doses did not
exceed the dose limit of 100 mSv over any period
of five years. The highest individual dose to a
Finnish nuclear power plant worker in the 5-year
period 1997–2001, 85.1 mSv, was received at Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant.
The collective occupational radiation dose for
both Loviisa plant units in 2001 was 1.13 manSv.
The collective occupational dose was 0.76 manSv
at Loviisa 1 and 0.37 manSv at Loviisa 2. The
collective occupational doses incurred over the
past years at Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plant
are given in Fig. 15. The yearly collective dose is
mostly incurred in outage work.
Occupational radiation doses incurred in the
annual maintenance outages are given in Appen-
dix 5. According to guidelines set by STUK, the
threshold guideline for the collective dose for one
Loviisa plant unit is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt
of net electric power averaged over two successive
years. This means 1.22 manSv per one Loviisa
plant unit. At Loviisa 1 this 2-year average design
value was exceeded by 0.04 manSv, which was due
to a greater-than-usual amount of planned and
unplanned work as well as of a prolonged 2000
annual maintenance.
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2001 were well
below authorised limits. The releases of gaseous
radioactive effluents were 0.03% of authorised
limits. In the releases of radioactive noble gases,
the activation product of argon-40, i.e. argon-41,
originating in the air space between the reactor
pressure vessel and the biological shield, was
dominant. The releases of radioactive iodine were
below the detection limit.  The tritium content of
liquid effluents, 14 TBq, is ca. 10% of the release
limit. The total activity of other liquid effluents
was 1.3 GBq, i.e. ca. 0.2% of the release limit.
Detailed information about the releases is given in
Table III.
The function of the release limits is to keep annual
individual exposure in the vicinity of nuclear pow-
er plants, arising from the operation of the plants,
well below the 100 µSv threshold value given in
the Government Resolution (395/1991). The dose
to the most exposed individual in the environment
of the nuclear power plants, calculated on the ba-
sis of releases, was ca. 0.35 µSv, i.e., 0.4% of the set
Dose range Number of persons by dose range
(mSv) Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,5 224 349 514
0.5–1 105 225 299
1–2 119 199 315
2–3 65 104 167
3–4 43 36 94
4–5 24 16 52
5–6 14 10 36
6–7 13 9 23
7–8 10 5 17
8–9 7 1 9
9–10 2 1 3
10–11 6 1 12
11–12 1 2 2
12–13 2 1 6
13–14 – – 1
14–15 – – 1
15–16 – – –
16–17 – – –
17–18 – – –
18–19 – – –
19–20 – – –
20–25 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in these columns also include Finnish
workers who have received doses at Swedish nuclear
power plants. The same person may have worked at
both Finnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
Table II. Occupational radiation dose distribution
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2001 for
different work categories.
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limit. Calculated annual radiation doses are given
in Fig. 16.
Radiation monitoring in the environment of
nuclear power plants comprises onsite and offsite
radiation measurements as well as determination
of radioactive substances to establish the popula-
tion radiation exposure and radioactive substanc-
es present in the environment.
In the vicinity of Loviisa nuclear power plant,
294 samples were analysed in accordance with a
monitoring programme. Radioactive substances
originating in Loviisa plant were measurable in
three samples of air, four samples of deposition,
one samle of bottom fauna, 10 samples of aquatic
plants, nine samples of sinking matter and four
samples of sea water. Cobalt-60 was a dominating
plant-based radioactive substance measured in all
of the aforementioned samples. The total number
of observations was 19. The next most common
radioactive substances were the radioactive iso-
Figure 15. Collective occupational doses at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Figure 16. Radiation dose estimates calculated for an indivisual of the most exposed population group
in the vicinity of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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Table III. Measured radioactive releases from Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in 2001.
Gaseous effluents by nuclide group (Bq) a)
Plant site Noble gases Iodines Aerosols Tritium Carbon-14
(Krypton-87 (Iodine-131
equivalents equivalents
lentteina)
Loviisa
Release in 2001 5.0 · 1012 –  b) 4.1 · 107 1.9 · 1011 3.1 · 1011
Annual release limit 2.2 · 1016 c) 2.2 · 1011 c)
Portion of the
release limit 0.03%
Olkiluoto
Release in 2001 5.7 · 1010 –  b) 3.3 · 107 3.9 · 1011 8.7 · 1011
Annual release limit 1.77 · 1016 1.14 · 1011
Portion of the
release limit 0.0004%
Liquid effluents by nuclide group (Bq) a)
Laitospaikka Tritium Other nuclides
Loviisa
Release in 2001 1.4 · 1013 1.3 · 109
Annual release limit 1.5 · 1014 8.9 · 1011 c)
Portion of the
release limit 10% 0.2%
Olkiluoto
Release in 2001 9.0 · 1011 8.7 · 108
Annual release limit 1.83 · 1013 2.96 · 1011
Portion of the
release limit 5% 0.3%
a) The unit of radioactivity is Becquerel (Bq): 1 Bq = one nuclear transformation per second.
b) Iodine releases were under the detection limit. The detection limit for the most significant iodine isotope was about
1·106 Bq/month in Loviisa and about 3·106 Bq/month in Olkiluoto.
c) The numerical value shows the release limit for the plant site by nuclide group, assuming that other releases would not
occur. The total release limit is calculated so that the sum of the various types of release limit shares does not
exceed 1.
topes of manganese and silver (silver-110m, 10
observations and manganese-54, 7 observations).
In some samples from the aquatic environment,
also the following radioactive substances were
detected: tritium (4 observations), cobalt-58 (1
observation).
All the detected concentrations were low and have
no bearing on radiation exposure.
Radioactive isotopes of strontium, caesium and
plutonium (strontium-90, caesium-134 and 137,
plutonium-238, 239 and 240), originating from the
Chernobyl accident and the fallout from nuclear
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weapons tests, are still measurable in environ-
mental samples. Natural radioactive substances
(i.a. beryllium-7, potassium-40 and uranium and
thorium with their decay products) are also de-
tected whose concentrations in the samples in
question are usually higher than those of radioac-
tive nuclides originating from power plants or
fallout.
Dosemeters measuring external radiation have
been placed in the environment of Finnish nuclear
power plants, in about 20 locations within a radius
of 1–10 km from the plants as well as 25 continu-
ously operating measurement stations within a 5-
km radius from the plants. The measurement data
yielded by the stations are transferred both to the
plants’ control rooms and the national radiation
monitoring network. Monitoring is complemented
by dose rate verification measurements and spec-
trometric measurements. In the environment of
Loviisa plant, 10 such measurements verifying
external radiation were made.
4.3 Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
4.3.1 Operation and operational events
Both units of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant oper-
ated reliably. The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was
97.6 % and that of Olkiluoto 2 was 95.1%. The
duration of the annual maintenance outage of
Olkiluoto 1 was eight days and that of Olkiluoto 2
15 days. The measures taken during the outages
are described in Appendix 5.
A reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 2 on 21
March 2001 in consequence of an operational
transient on the turbine side. The event is de-
scribed in more detail in Appendix 6. The annual
maintenance outages were the only production
breaks at the Olkiluoto plant units.
Production losses from component malfunc-
tions were 0.01% at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.5% at
Olkiluoto 2.
Fig. 9 gives the daily average gross powers of
the plant units in 2001. Load factors and the
number of reactor scrams over the past years are
given in Figs. 10 and 11.
One event at the Olkiluoto plant units was
INES Level 1. Weakened reliability of the system
cooling the reactor in an accident situation had
been observed at the Olkiluoto plant units, which
was due to valve actuator gear tooth failures.
Other events had no bearing on nuclear or radia-
tion safety. The most significant events are de-
scribed in Appendix 6. The total number of events
at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear
power plant units is given in Fig 12.
4.3.2 Non-compliances with the Technical
Specifications
At the Olkiluoto plant the following three events
were in non-compliance with the Technical Speci-
fications:
• Automation preventing reactor control rod
withdrawal was bypassed at Olkiluoto 2
• Reactor control rod position data was unavaila-
ble in the control room of Olkiluoto 2
• In operability of two reactor feed water conduc-
tivity maeasurements at Olkiluoto 2.
Event descriptions are given in Appendix 6.
The licensee has planned, or already imple-
mented, measures to prevent recurrence. Fig. 13
gives the number of non-compliances with the
Technical Specifications over the past years.
The Technical Specifications were deviated
from by virtue of exemptions granted by STUK. In
2001 STUK granted six such exemptions for the
Olkiluoto plant units based on the licensee’s appli-
cation. The yearly number of exemptions is given
in Fig. 14.
4.3.3 Event investigation
Teollisuuden Voima Oy clarified whether the
number of plant events in non-compliance with
the Technical Specifications could be reduced by
measures recommended in a STUK research re-
port completed in 2000. The piece of research in
question is described in Annual Report 2000
(STUK-B-YTO 208) and the plant events deviat-
ing from the Technical Specifications in Annual
Report 1999 (STUK-B-YTO 202).
Teollisuuden Voima Oy considered sufficient
the procedures whose revision STUK had recom-
mended. STUK considers them insufficient since
events deviating from the Technical Specifications
still occur and their number at Olkiluoto power
plant has not been reduced. The handling of the
matter with the licensee therefore continues.
STUK has further requested a report on how the
licensee will develop their change management
procedures as well as their procedures for reduc-
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ing excess routine in work and for improving the
flow of information within their organisation.
4.3.4 Safety improvements
Modifications to improve safety at Olkiluoto pow-
er plant were based on the requirements of the
YVL guides and on operational experience.
Modifications relating to severe accident man-
agement were continued at both plant units. The
most important of them was the strengthening of
the personnel lock of the Olkiluoto 1 containment.
With this modification the pressure shock resist-
ance of the containment in case of pressure shocks
during severe accidents was improved. In addi-
tion, lye tanks were installed at the plant units to
inject lye for containment water pH regulation. In
this way iodine release from fuel to the environ-
ment during accidents is prevented as efficiently
as possible.
Some modifications based on operational expe-
rience were also made at the plant units. These
included replacement of the rod control and rod
position indication system of control rods as well
as of the measurement computer, and the replace-
ment of rotating converters by UPS equipment.
The fire detection system was also replaced.
The safety improvements are described in Ap-
pendix 7.
4.3.5 Probabilistic safety analyses
The updating of Level 1 safety analysis (PSA) for
the Olkiluoto plant units was reviewed. Level 1
PSA assesses the probability of a reactor core melt.
The core melt frequency for the Olkiluoto plant
units estimated in Level 1 PSA is ca. 2.0×10-5/year.
No single initiating event dominates the overall
result even if the share of seismic initiating events
is relatively high, i.e. 25%. A degree of conserva-
tism is related to earthquake modelling, however,
whose impact could not be assessed by this analy-
sis. Another significant feature of the Olkiluoto
PSA is that the share of annual maintenance
outages of the core melt frequency is small, i.e. ca.
2%. This is partly due to improved guidelines and
procedures and careful work planning during an-
nual maintenance outages.
Accident risk at the Olkiluoto plant units is
most effectively reduced by improved manual
measures in switching on the power supply back-
up from the neighbouring plant units’ stand-up
generators or in starting high pressure water
back-up units during certain transients or in cali-
brating reactor water level measurements.
No disadvantages surfaced during the review
of the updating of the PSA which would essential-
ly have changed the analysis results or the conclu-
sions made from them.
The review of the Level 2 PSA for the Olkiluoto
plant units was completed. Level 2 assesses the
volume of radioactive substances released from
the reactor containment to the environment in
consequence of an accident as well as related
release probability. The PSA yielded a release
frequency of ca. 5.5 · 10–6/year (internal and exter-
nal initiating events included).
No significant shortcomings were observed in
the review of Olkiluoto Level 2 PSA. In the newest
Level 2 PSA update, minor releases have been
modelled more closely than before to make the
model better suited for the comparison of various
scenarios and for risk studies.
4.3.6 Radiation safety
The radiation doses of those who worked at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2001 were below
the annual limit of 50 mSv. The distribution of
individual doses in 2001 is given in Table II. The
highest individual dose at Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant was 12.7 mSv. It was mostly received while
working at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 during annual main-
tenance outages. No individual dose in 1997-2001
exceeded the 100 mSv dose limit applied to any 5-
year period.
According to STUK guidelines the threshold
for one plant unit’s collective dose is 2.10 manSv,
averaged over two successive years. The threshold
value was exceeded in neither plant unit. In 2001
the collective occupational dose was 0.367 manSv
at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.816 manSv at Olkiluoto 2, i.e.
a total of 1.18 manSv for both plant units. Collec-
tive radiation doses for Loviisa and Olkiluoto
power plants over the past years are given in Fig
15. Doses incurred during annual maintenance
outages are described in Appendix 5.
Radioactive releases from Olkiluoto nuclear
power plant into the environment in 2001 were
well below authorised limits. The releases of gase-
ous radioactive effluents were 0.0004% of author-
ised limits. Radioactive iodine releases were below
the detection limit. The tritium content of liquid
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effluents, 0.9 TBq, is ca. 5% of the annual release
limit. The total activity of other liquid effluents
was 0.9%, which is ca. 0.3% of the plant-specific
release limit. Measured radioactive releases are
given in Table III.
The radiation dose calculated for the most
exposed individual in the environment of the plant
on the basis of releases was ca. 0.05 µSv, i.e. 0.06%
of the limit (100 µSv) established by a Govern-
ment Resolution. Annual calculated radiation dos-
es are given in Fig 16.
Environmental radiation monitoring around a
nuclear power plant comprises on- and offsite
measurements as well as determinations of radio-
active substances to establish public exposure and
radioactive substances present in the environ-
ment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant, 300 samples were analysed in accordance
with a monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in Olkiluoto plant were meas-
urable in two samples of air, one sample of deposi-
tion, one sample of rain water deposited material,
one sample of lichen, two samples of bottom fauna,
one sea water sample and 16 samples of aquatic
plants, 16 samples of sinking matter and one
sample of soil. The dominating plant-based radio-
active substance, cobalt-60, was measured in all of
the aforementioned samples. The total number of
observations was 38. In addition to cobalt, manga-
nese-54 was measured in four samples of aquatic
plants. An elevated tritium concentration was ob-
served in one sample of deposited material.
All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing of radiation exposure.
In addition, 14 measurements to verify exter-
nal radiation were made in the environment of
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
4.4 Fifth reactor in planning
Teollisuuden Voima Oy on 15 November submit-
ted to the Government an application for a deci-
sion in principle on the construction of a new nu-
clear power plant unit. The application is for a
unit equipped with a light water reactor, with an
output of ca.1000–1600 MW, to be placed on either
of the existing nuclear power plant sites. The ap-
plication covers other nuclear facilities onsite re-
lating to the plant unit’s operation, i.e. for han-
dling of fresh nuclear fuel, for intermediate stor-
age of spent nuclear fuel, and for treatment, stor-
age and final disposal of low- and intermediate-
level reactor waste. Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s ap-
plication describes the seven types of light water
reactor on offer.
On 8 February 2001 STUK submitted to the
Government a preliminary safety evaluation on
the new nuclear power plant unit and how it
would meet current Finnish requirements for nu-
clear safety. The evaluation is based on the Nucle-
ar Energy Act and was drawn up at the Ministry
for Trade and Industry’s request.
STUK’s preliminary safety evaluation did not
bring forth anything to suggest it would not be
possible to bring the plant alternatives up to the
Finnish safety standards. However, none of the
offered facility concepts do, as such, meet all
requirements. The character and scope of the
necessary modifications considerably vary plant
by plant.
According to STUK’s evaluation nothing pre-
vents the construction of a new plant unit on
either of the existing plant sites. Radioactive re-
leases from the new facility, combined with releas-
es from those already in operation, would clearly
remain below site-specific total release limits. Con-
siderations expressed in statements on environ-
mental impact assessment reports shall be taken
into account, however, to assure a sufficient cool-
ant water supply to the power plant.
In STUK’s understanding, Teollisuuden Voima
Oy should develop in the construction phase al-
ready its organisation, operation and technical
expertise with a view to the design of safety-
important systems to assure safe plant operation
in a situation where no comprehensive safety
design services are available on the market.
On the old plant sites nothing prevents the safe
handling of low- and intermediate-level reactor
waste generated during the operation of the new
nuclear power plant unit. The facilities for the
final disposal of low- and intermediate level waste
can be enlarged in such a way that the safety of
final disposal is not compromised.
The spent fuel generated by the new power
plant unit Teollisuuden Voima Oy plans to dispose
of in the same way as that generated by the
operating plants, i.e. in a final repository in bed-
rock in a way reliably preventing the spreading of
radioactive substances back to the biosphere for a
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sufficiently long time. STUK has reviewed the
final repository for spent fuel in the preliminary
safety analysis report of 11 January 2000 on
Posiva Oy’s application for a decision in principle.
In its application Teollisuuden Voima Oy notes
that the final choice may well be some other light
water reactor than the one in the application.
STUK has followed nuclear engineering develop-
ments but how other types of light water reactor
would meet Finnish safety requirements must be
separately assessed, should such a choice become
topical.
During February the Ministry of Trade and
Industry arranged public hearings in the candi-
date municipalities in which STUK presented the
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 on
the United States STUK launched an investiga-
tion into the safety of domestic nuclear power
plants in case of similar terrorist deeds.
A Supplement to the Preliminary Safety Eval-
uation, which made more specific safety require-
ments regarding aircraft impacts and other corre-
sponding external threats, was submitted to the
Ministry of  Trade and Industry in January 2002.
The Preliminary Safety Evaluation and the
Supplement can be found in STUK’s Web pages at
http://www.stuk.fi/english/npp/5th_npp.html.
4.5 Other nuclear facilities
FiR 1 research reactor
STUK regulates electricity-generating nuclear
power plants as well as the FiR 1 research reactor
operated by the Technical Research Centre of Fin-
land (VTT). The reactor is located in Otaniemi,
Espoo, and its maximum thermal power is 250 kW.
The reactor is used for fabrication of radioactive
tracers, activation analysis, student training and
treatment of brain tumours by neutron irradiation
(Boron Neutron Capture Therapy—BNCT) as well
as development of BNCT therapy.
STUK’s periodic inspections in February fo-
cused on the reactor’s operation, emergency pre-
paredness, training, radiation protection and
measurements, radioactive releases, and nuclear
waste storage and accounting, and in December on
fire protection. No safety problems were observed.
The performance characteristics of the reac-
tor’s BNCT irradiation unit are good. In addition,
VTT has investigated a power uprate test, with
financing from Tekes, the National Technology
Agency, to reduce irradiation time required for
treatment. STUK has reviewed some related safe-
ty questions. VTT informed, however, that it will
not implement the project in 2001.
The head of operation of the research reactor
on 30 January 2001 noticed that the licences of the
reactor’s three foremen and two operators, grant-
ed by STUK, had expired on 31 December 2000.
The reactor had been operated seven times in
January. Each time the three foremen with ex-
pired licences had taken turns as heads of opera-
tion. The operators’ licences had been valid. VTT
arranged on 6 February 2001 a written exam for
the approval of foremen and operators in which
the above foremen participated. At VTT’s request
STUK approved of their continued working as
foremen. The event has no bearing on safety since
the persons in question were experienced workers.
The event was classified INES Level 0.
Occupational radiation doses and radioactive
releases into the environment in 2001 were clearly
below set limits.
Nuclear waste management facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities per-
taining to nuclear waste management, such as
storage space, is dealt with in Chapter 5.
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5.1 Spent nuclear fuel
STUK monitored the storage of spent nuclear fuel
by regular inspections and by reviewing plans and
witnessing work pertaining to storage equipment.
No storage-related events occurred that would
have endangered safety. The yearly volumes of
spent fuel stored onsite are given in Figure 17.
Posiva Oy, a company owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy and Fortum Power and Heat Oy, carries
out R&D and planning into spent fuel disposal
and prepares for implementation at a later date.
The company in May 1999 submitted an applica-
tion for a decision in principle on the construction
of a final disposal facility in Olkiluoto. The deci-
sion in principle made by Government in Decem-
ber 2000 was ratified by the Finnish Parliament in
May 2001.
The final disposal project’s other main objects are
to start facility construction in early 2010, with
commissioning in early 2020. During the next 10
years, Posiva plans to implement an extensive re-
search, development and design programme to as-
sure site suitability and to obtain research data
ensuring safe final disposal. This programme in-
cludes the construction of an underground re-
search facility in Olkiluoto.
STUK gave an expert opinion on this action
plan for final disposal, which was published by
Posiva Oy in early 2001. STUK submitted its
statement on the action plan to the Ministry of
Trade and Industry in September. In addition to
the opinions of own experts in the matter, STUK
consulted six foreign experts. The Advisory Com-
mittee on Nuclear Safety, functioning in conjunc-
5 Regulatory control of nuclear waste
management
Figure 17. The volume of spent nuclear fuel on plant sites at the end of the year.
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tion with STUK, submitted a statement to STUK.
STUK assessed as too tight Posiva Oy’s timeta-
ble for reaching construction licence readiness.
Even the first phase, the main objective of which
is to complete determination of the baseline of the
bedrock prior to the construction of an under-
ground research facility, will take at least a year
longer than planned. In addition, tests to be con-
ducted in the underground facility and the devel-
opment of encapsulation and final disposal tech-
nology may take longer than planned. However,
STUK estimates as realistic the repository project
main objective, i.e. readiness to commence final
disposal in early 2020.
The main objective of Posiva Oy’s geological
research programme is to assure the suitability of
Olkiluoto bedrock for final disposal. STUK as-
sessed the programme as basically realistic but
gave, at the same time, several possible further
research topics for Posiva Oy to consider regard-
ing features specific to the Olkiluoto bedrock in
particular.
Posiva Oy is in the process of developing safety
analysis methods and conducting safety research
in preparation of a preliminary safety assessment
required for inclusion in the construction licence
application for the repository. STUK suggested
some further objects of development and that
Posiva Oy publish a detailed progress report in
2005 on its safety analysis development projects.
The underground research facility, whose con-
struction in Olkiluoto will start in a few years,
may later become part of an actual repository, a
fact to be taken into account in the regulatory
control of its implementation. STUK sent a letter
to Posiva Oy in September concerning the objec-
tives, procedures and allocation of regulatory con-
trol. The starting point being that STUK has to be
able to form a real-time picture of questions essen-
tial for safety and relay it direct to Posiva.
Posiva Oy in 2001 continued its bedrock stud-
ies in Olkiluoto to establish the area’s baseline
and to support the designing of an underground
research facility. The studies are overseen by four
STUK follow-up groups whose members include
domestic and foreign experts outside STUK.
In June 2001 Posiva Oy extended its co-opera-
tion agreement with the Swedish nuclear waste
company SKB to include research, development
and design relating to the encapsulation of spent
fuel. Posiva thus acquired SKB’s encapsulation
know-how and the right to participate in large-
scale test programmes in the Oskarshamn encap-
sulation laboratory in Sweden.
5.2 Reactor waste
Fortum Power and Heat Oy plans on the site of
Loviisa nuclear power plant a solidification facili-
ty for medium level waste, since the plant’s onsite
storages for liquid waste are nearly filled to capac-
ity. Plans are to treat at the solidification facility
all liquid waste, such as ion exchange resins and
evaporation waste, generated at the power plant.
Even waste accumulating during the decommis-
sioning of the plant will be solified in this facility.
The waste will be medium- and low-level and it
will be solidified in concrete.
The solidification facility in principle is a nu-
clear facility referred to the Nuclear Energy Act
but requires no construction licence since the
power plant’s operating licence authorises STUK’s
approval of its construction as a plant modifica-
tion referred to in Section 112 of the Nuclear
Energy Act.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy submitted the
solidification facility’s Preliminary Safety Analysis
Report to STUK for review in early 2000. The most
important objects of the review were the solidifica-
tion process proper, the waste package transfer
system, occupational radiation protection and def-
inition of the characteristics of solidification prod-
ucts. STUK made a safety assessment of the
facility based on the review and in March 2001
approved the facility’s Preliminary Safety Analy-
sis Report.
STUK’s safety assessment considers the solidi-
fication facility rather safe for the environment.
The volumes of waste treated at a time are small
and contain no hazardous amounts of gaseous or
volatile radioactive substances. No high pressures
or temperatures are required by the process and
the facility contains no significant fire loads. Expe-
riences of the operation of several corresponding
facilities have been are good. The technical re-
marks issued on the basis of the review do not
prevent the starting of the facility’s construction.
As a result of the regular inspections concern-
ing reactor waste management, STUK made re-
marks on i.a. the nuclear waste accounting sys-
tem. The most important observation about the
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final disposal of reactor waste was that removal of
leak water from the repository of Loviisa power
plant had stopped for about a week because all
pumps had broken. Several hundreds cubic meters
of water had consequently flowed through over-
flow channels to the yet-uncompleted solidified
waste hall from where it was later removed.
By STUK’s permission, scrap metal, mainte-
nance waste and waste oil from nuclear power
plants were cleared from regulatory control. Li-
cences issued by STUK are listed in Appendix 2.
No safety-related problems occurred in the
treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor
waste. Yearly waste volumes are given in Figure
18.
5.3 Other control activities
STUK gave to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
a statement, as referred to in section 78 of the
Nuclear Energy Decree, about the licensees’ nucle-
ar waste management measures and plans as well
as a statement, as referred to in section 90 of the
Nuclear Energy Decree, about making financial
provision for the costs of nuclear waste manage-
ment. These regular statements assess whether, in
preparing for nuclear waste management, the li-
censees have proceeded according to goals set out
by the government. At the same time, provision
made for the future cost of nuclear waste is being
assessed.
Bonvesta Oy in 1992-1995 carried out some
remedial actions in the former uranium mine area
of Paukkajavaara, which were overseen by STUK.
The measures were followed by a surveillance
period of about five years. On the basis of inspec-
tions and measurements STUK ascertained that
mining wastes had been successfully isolated and
that no elevated concentrations of radioactivity
deviating from the environment and originating in
the disposed waste were measurable. STUK is-
sued Bonvesta Oy a certificate, in accordance with
Section 84 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, attesting
to the acceptability of the final disposal.
Figure 18. The volume of reactor waste at the end of the year.
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6.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear
facilities
As regards nuclear power plants, STUK’s safe-
guards focused on the import, storage, domestic
transfer and reloading of fuel. The licensees sub-
mit to STUK the necessary annual plans, advance
notices and reports in compliance with safeguards
requirements
In 2001 the number of safeguards inspections
at Loviisa nuclear power plant was 10 and at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 16. Euratom Safe-
guards Office (ESO) participated in 16 and the
IAEA in 19 inspections. ESO used 30 and the
IAEA 22 man-days. Both reactor units of Loviisa
nuclear power plant, the fresh fuel storage and the
two spent fuel storages comprise one unit in
nuclear material accounting, i.e. a material bal-
ance area. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has three
material balance areas: Olkiluoto 1, Olkiluoto 2
and a spent fuel storage.
STUK verified by NDA measurement 53 spent
fuel assemblies at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
At Loviisa nuclear power plant, 96 spent fuel
assemblies were verified. Safeguards employs sev-
eral verification methods to verify that the nucle-
ar materials data given by the users, such as burn-
out and cooling time, are correct and complete.
Even other matters relating to nuclear safety,
ranging from operational safety to final disposal,
can be verified by measurements.
In addition to the domestic nuclear power
plants, minor amounts of nuclear material can be
found at other facilities. The most significant of
these is FiR 1, the research reactor operated by
the VTT. Also the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at
the Department of Chemistry of the University of
Helsinki and STUK possess small amounts of
nuclear materials. In 2001 two inspections were
conducted on FiR 1.
International safeguards is implemented by
the IAEA and ESO. IAEA safeguards are based on
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards
Agreement signed by non-nuclear EU member
states, Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193).
ESO safeguards are based on the Euratom Treaty
and Commission Regulation 3227/76 given by vir-
tue of the Treaty. STUK participated in inspec-
tions carried out by international organisations.
ESO and the IAEA have agreed on co-operation
in the field of inspections (New Partnership Ap-
proach, NPA). At practical level, ESO and the
IAEA co-operate in the conducting of inspections
in all material balance areas. ESO conducts peri-
odic inspections at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 but inspec-
tions of the KPA storage, which are made at the
same time, have participants from both ESO and
the IAEA.
Operation in all material balance areas was in
accordance with manuals approved by STUK, fa-
cilitating the implementation by STUK of the
obligations of international nuclear agreements
signed by Finland. In 2001 ESO and the IAEA
delivered to STUK 18 joint reports consisting of
ESO inspection reports and IAEA reports. Accord-
ing to the reports national obligations had been
fulfilled in compliance with INFCIRC/193.
After the disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weap-
ons programme, the IAEA launched an extensive
programme to strengthen the safeguards system.
This overall safeguards renewal is based on the
commencement of safeguards based on the Model
Protocol Additional (INFCIRC/540) as well as the
integration of “old” (in accordance with the Safe-
guards Agreement) and “new” safeguards (in ac-
cordance with the Model Protocol Additional). Fin-
land ratified the Protocol on 30 June 2000. It will
come into force in all non-nuclear EU member
countries simultaneously. Italy and Belgium,
among others, had not yet in 2001 ratified the
Model Protocol Additional. STUK, IAEA and ESO
6 Regulatory control of nuclear materials
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Figure 19. The number of consignments contain-
ing radioactive materials turned back at the border.
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have tested safeguards implementation in accord-
ance with the Protocol in a field test at VTT
Chemical Technology. As the most important re-
sult of the test, the flow of information concerning
data referred to in the Protocol was described and
the roles and responsibilities of those participat-
ing in regulatory work were determined.
In 2001 STUK authorised eight ESO and 26
IAEA inspectors to inspect domestic nuclear facili-
ties.
The report STUK-B-YTO 213 (in Finnish) takes
a closer look at safeguards.
6.2 Control of radioactive materials
transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transport-
ed in Finland every year. STUK is not aware of
any transport accidents involving radioactive ma-
terials, or of any other safety hazards.
The transport of nuclear materials requires a
licence from STUK. A prerequisite for the licence
is, among other things, that nuclear liability insur-
ance and sufficient physical protection are in
place. In 2001 STUK granted one nuclear trans-
port licence to Fortum Power and Heat Oy for the
importation and exportation of fresh fuel. STUK
approved four transport plans for the importation
of fresh fuel. STUK approved one package type for
use in Finland. The most important forms of
nuclear material transport in 2001 were imports
of fresh nuclear fuel (a total of 430 fuel assem-
blies) from Germany, Spain and Russia as well as
two fresh fuel rods from Germany for use at
Finnish nuclear power plants.
The importation of radioactive and nuclear
materials is subject to licence, too. No attempts at
nuclear smuggling were observed at the Finnish
borders in 2001.
In 2001 no shipments containing radioactive
material were turned back at the border. The
highest number, 23 consignments, was turned back
in 1997. The number is smaller now than in
previous years, partly because consignors and con-
signees have, through training and experience,
come to understand the possibility of radioactivity
in consignments of scrap metal. Control at the
borders has been enhanced and, at the same time,
consignments of scrap metal to Finland have de-
creased and goods arriving from Russia to Finland
have already passed Russian radiation measure-
ment control.
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STUK’s experts controlled and monitored the on-
going, publicly financed national nuclear power
plant safety and waste research programmes
FINNUS 1999–2002 and JYT2001. STUK commis-
sioned nuclear power plant safety and waste man-
agement research to external organisations, which
in 2001 were as follows: VTT Automation, VTT
Chemical Technology, VTT Energy, VTT Industrial
Systems, VTT Processes, VTT Building and Trans-
port, the Geological Survey of Finland (GSF), the
Finnish Institute of Marine Research (MTL), TKK
Laboratory of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics,
TKK Laboratory of Physical Metallurgy and Mate-
rials Science, Helsinki University Laboratory of
Radiochemistry, Uppsala University, St Petersburg
State University, University of Aberdeen, Univer-
sity Polytechnic of Catalonia, NEMKO Product
Services and Serco Assurance (formerly AEA Tech-
nology plc) Inspection Validation Centre (IVC).
The research topics of the FINNUS 1999-2002
programme in 2001 were nuclear power plant
ageing, reactor accidents and various risks. The
programme is arranged into eleven research
projects whose data, such as results, costs and
hours spend, are available at http://www.vtt.fi/
ene/tutkimus/finnus/. The FINNUS programme
annual report can be found at the same web
address.
In 2001, 35 nuclear power plant safety projects
commissioned and financed by STUK were
launched. They included reference analyses and
reports as well as studies aiming at enhancement
of inspection and analysis readiness in nuclear
power plant structural and reactor safety as well
as in safety management. In the field of reactor
safety, STUK contributed to the following five
international research programmes: NRC/CAMP
and CSARP; OECD/SETH, LHF and MASCA. In
addition, projects to improve the regulatory con-
trol effort were started.
The research topics of the JYT2001 programme
in 2001 were the same as before, i.e. earth scienc-
es, technical barriers, migration of radioactive
substances, safety analyses and technical solu-
tions. The JYT2001 programme has also included
research topics in social sciences. The programme’s
final report is due in early 2002 in a Ministry of
Trade and Industry publication series called re-
search and reports. Information on the programme
can be found at www.vtt.fi/ene/tutkimus/jyt2001
(in Finnish).
Appendix 4 lists STUK-financed safety re-
search completed in 2001. Part of it closely relates
to nuclear safety regulation and is presented in a
group of their own, separatly from the FINNUS
and JYT programmes. STUK’s research pro-
gramme includes projects dealing with the devel-
opment and assessment of operational inspections
and review. The annual cost of nuclear safety
research is given in Fig 20.
Topical nuclear safety research and publica-
tions are reported in STUK’s web pages at
www.stuk.fi/tutkimustoiminta/ (in Finnish). The
current number of projects is as follows: 47 re-
search projects into nuclear safety and 36 re-
search projects into the safety of nuclear waste
management.
To assure the independence of nuclear power
plant safety research STUK commissioned to an
external consultant follow-up audits of the quality
systems of two of VTT’s research units. An exter-
nal consultant audited also the quality system of
the Geological Survey of Finland (GSF). The re-
sults of the audits were reported in feedback
meetings arranged by STUK  to persons responsi-
ble for quality in the organisation units in ques-
tion and to STUK’s respective persons in charge of
nuclear safety research.
7 Safety research
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Figure 20. The costs of nuclear safety research.
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8 Emergency response
STUK arranged several training events and excer-
cises to test and develop its emergency response.
Emergency training was arranged for experts from
foreign authorities. In addition, STUK controlled
the preparedness of the operating organisations of
nuclear power plants to act in unusual situations.
No such situations occurred in 2001.
Various types of emergency exercises were ar-
ranged in Finland in 2001 into which STUK par-
ticipated. An emergency exercise and training
event was arranged in Rauma town on 5 Septem-
ber 2001 concerning Olkiluoto power plant. Repre-
sentatives of the licensee and several authorities
participated. Loviisa power plant’s emergency ex-
ercise was on 28 November 2001 and STUK par-
ticipated in it in accordance with the emergency
plan. In addition, emergency response at the FiR 1
research reactor was tested on 25 September 2001.
A fire drill was arranged at Loviisa power plant on
2 May 2001. Olkiluoto power plant’s fire drill was
on 19 November 2001.
Emergency response at nuclear power plants
has been continuously developed during plant
operation and regularly tested in emergency exer-
cises as part of emergency preparedness training.
STUK has approved the emergency plans of Lovii-
sa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and re-
views every year the implementation of the emer-
gency preparedness regime, including training and
emergency excercises.
STUK participated in nuclear power plant
emergency exercises of international scale. The
JINEX-1 emergency exercise was arranged in
France on 22–23 May 2001 with 55 countries and
five international organisations taking part. The
exercise, which lasted for over 24 hours, tested the
flow of information and the methods of passing
information as well as the forming an overall
picture of the accident situation, and decision-
making. The long-duration exercise facilitated also
a shift change. International data exchange was of
foremost importance also during the Swedish
ALEX emergency exercise on 28 March 2001,
which was part of an extensive Barents Rescue
exercise.
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9 Communications
STUK took the initiative in communicating to the
general public matters relating to the safety, nu-
clear waste management and safeguards at nucle-
ar power plants and also responded to questions
made by the media. STUK issued bulletins or
press releases on almost 20 different topics. The
material was also published on the Teletex pages
of YLE (Finnish Broadcasting Company) and on
its own Web site. In addition, the matters were
discussed in the STUK publication ALARA that
comes out four times a year. The media and liaison
groups were provided with quarterly reports on
the nuclear safety in Finland and in its neighbour-
ing countries.
A reader survey was conducted to establish
how interesting readers find the contents of the
quarterly report on nuclear safety. With the report
on the first quarter of 2001, a questionnaire was
sent to over 400 regular report recipients, 31% of
which replied. The recipients were asked how
closely (closely/ occasionally/ not at all) they follow
the report’s various sections. The degree of inter-
est in the various sections was assessed based on
the number of people saying they closely followed
the section in question. The most closely followed
section was thus that on emergency preparedness,
which 52% of the readers said they followed close-
ly. The next most read sections were those on
Loviisa nuclear power plant and on nuclear power
plants in Finland’s neighbouring countries (46%
and 45%). Next came Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant and the regulatory control of nuclear power
plants (39% and 41%). 32% told they followed
nuclear waste management and 21% expressed
interest in nuclear safeguards. In addition, the
survey mapped the need for a hard copy of the
report now that it is available at STUK’s Web
page. 76% of those who replied wanted a printed
version of the report by mail.
On STUK’s Web site, under The Reader’s Link,
citizens made questions to STUK’s experts. In
2001, 250 questions were made 5% of which were
about the use of nuclear energy.
Of the events at Finnish nuclear power plants,
the media were informed about a leak of mildly
radioactive water during the annual maintenance
outage of Loviisa plant as well as valve actuator
malfunctions in the emergency coolant system of
the Olkiluoto plant units. The plant units’ annual
maintenance outages and brief production breaks
were reported. Brief production breaks were
caused by reactor scrams at Loviisa 1 and Olkiluo-
to 2 and repair outages of which there were one at
both Loviisa units.
As regards nuclear waste management, STUK
provided information about a review report sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This
review report addressed the research, develop-
ment and technical design programme for spent
nuclear fuel disposal, prepared by the nuclear
waste company Posiva Oy. As regards nuclear ma-
terial safeguards, a summary report was issued on
radioactive shipments turned back at Finland’s
eastern border in 2000.
In connection with projects to improve nuclear
safety in countries in Eastern Europe, information
was disseminated, among others, about a new
safety system installed at Kola nuclear power
plant and a meeting in St Petersburg dealing with
safety analyses made for the Leningrad nuclear
power plants as an international project. The
Kursk submarine lifting operation was reported
as well.
Information was published about issues relat-
ing to international co-operation, i.a. a nuclear
safety report submitted to the IAEA based on the
International Nuclear Safety Convention, the In-
ternational Nuclear Waste Convention, meetings
hosted by STUK, nuclear safety regulation in the
EU applicant countries and STUK’s participation
in an international nuclear emergency exercise.
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10 International co-operation
Co-operation with the IAEA
STUK prepared to the IAEA several statements
requested from Finland (see Appendix 3) on draft
guides belonging to an ongoing revision of the
IAEA’s nuclear safety and nuclear waste manage-
ment regulations (NUSS and RADWASS). The re-
vision is nearing completion. STUK participated
in the preparation of the draft guides. STUK also
participated in the work of the permanent NUSSC
and WASSC committees guiding the work on the
guides.
A report, whose submission is required every
three years in the International Nuclear Safety
Convention, was sent to the Convention Secretari-
at at the IAEA in autumn 2001. It describes how
the Convention’s obligations have been met. The
next review meeting is due in 2002.
The Joint Convention on the safety of spent
fuel and radioactive waste management took ef-
fect on 18 June 2001. STUK in December 2001
participated in the preparatory meeting of the
Convention’s first review meeting where rules of
procedures and financial rules, practical meeting
arrangements and the contents of national reports
were agreed upon.
Also in 2001, a representative of STUK contin-
ued to function as one of the advisors (SAGSI) to
the Director General of the IAEA in safeguards
matters. The group met four times in 2001 and
mostly discussed an overall safeguards reform.
Via the nuclear power plant Incident Reporting
System (IRS), maintained by the IAEA and the
OECD/NEA, 85 reports were received. By means
of the system, nuclear power plant operational
events and observations, which may give an im-
pulse to safety improvements at other nuclear
power plants, are communicated to the participat-
ing countries. STUK is the co-ordinating organisa-
tion in Finland. The database is on a CD, which is
updated four times a year and accessible in Fin-
land to STUK and the licensees. The IAEA is in
the process of developing an Internet-based data-
base for the recording and accessing of event data.
IRS reports were assessed by STUK and the
licensees. The reports analysed in 2001 did not
warrant significant changes in the plant struc-
tures or operational practices at Finnish nuclear
power plants. The procedures in use at Finnish
plants were reviewed due to some events. Finland
reported to the IRS system a common-cause fail-
ure of motor-operated reactor core spray system
valves at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant caused by
failures and cracks in the bakelite gear teeth of
valve actuators. The event is described in Appen-
dix 6.
STUK is also a contact organisation in an
information exchange system maintained by the
IAEA for the events at research reactor facilities
(Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors—IRSRR). The system started operation some
years ago and there were 31 participating coun-
tries at the end of 2001. An Internet-based data-
base is under development for use in the system.
For this purpose events at the research reactor
over the past years have been collected. Data
communication to countries in the system has so
far mostly taken place at the system’s annual
meetings. In 2001 no events reportable to the
system occurred in Finland.
The IAEA communicated through the INES
information exchange system (International Nu-
clear Event Scale—INES) information on 26
events, 16 of which dealt with nuclear power
plants and ten with the use of radiation sources.
None of them were above INES Level 2. A re-
quired reporting criterion is that events are at
least Level 2, or above, on the INES Scale or are,
or may be, of interest internationally. A system
called Nuclear Event Web-based System (NEWS)
was commissioned for event data transmission.
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Access rights to the system are held by 18 individ-
uals in Finland who represent five organisations
(STUK, Ministry for Trade and Industry, Fortum
Power and Heat Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oy, State
Technical Research Centre). When event data has
been entered into the system by a contact person
those with access rights immediately receive the
information. The Finnish INES contact person is
from STUK. No INES reportable events occurred
in Finland in 2001.
A representative of STUK worked as a co-
ordinator to East and Middle European assistance
programmes funded from the IAEA’s safeguards
support programme. The Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs finances the programme that is executed by
STUK. The programme objectives include develop-
ment of the IAEA’s safeguards procedures, train-
ing of inspectors and provision of expert assist-
ance.
In IAEA expert capacity, STUK’s representa-
tives participated in the IRRT assessment of nu-
clear safety authorities in Lithuania and the Czech
Republic. A representative of STUK has also par-
ticipated, as an IAEA expert, in work that com-
pares the fuel design criteria of Russian VVER
reactors with that of Western pressurised water
reactors. The final report contains the comparison
material and recommendations for further action.
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
International co-operation in nuclear safety re-
search was mostly channelled through the OECD/
NEA. The organisation also facilitated an ex-
change of opinions between authorities about the
need to develop nuclear safety regulations and the
contents of individual regulations. STUK was rep-
resented in all of the organisation’s main commit-
tees dealing with radiation and nuclear safety. The
main committees are as follows:
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions—CSNI,
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities—
CNRA,
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public
Health—CRPPH, and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee—
RWMC.
STUK’s Director General acted as the chairman of
the CNRA. In addition, STUK took part in the
work of the below working groups set up by the
committees.
In early 2001 the CNRA had only one perma-
nent working group looking at regulatory safety
inspection practices, namely the Working Group
on Inspection Practices (WGIP). The group’s work
focused on the gathering, exchange and assess-
ment of regulatory inspection practices as well as
on the publication of commendable practices. It
assembled twice, once in STUK. The WGIP pub-
lished six reports about the strengthening of the
regulatory effort to ensure the safe operation of
nuclear facilities, e.g. about effectiveness of in-
spections and about inspection of preventive main-
tenance on safety systems during plant operation,
among others. In addition, a report about regula-
tory inspection practices in OECD member coun-
tries and non-member countries was updated. The
status report provided insights into the frame-
work of inspection philosophies, organisational
aspects and practices utilised within these coun-
ties Under preparation were reports about the
supervision and inspection of the work of sub-
contractors, as well as the inspection of research
reactors and other facilities contributing to the
nuclear fuel cycle. Proceedings  were published of
a 2000 WGIP seminar, the fifth in line in a series
of International Workshops, dealing with radia-
tion protection inspections and regulatory inspec-
tions required during and after shutdowns as well
as the use of objective indicators by authorities in
evaluating of the performance of plants.
The CNRA set up a new permanent working
group, the Working Group on Public Communcia-
tion of Nuclear Regulatory Organisations (WGPC)
whose first meeting was in 2001.
There are six CSNI working groups into whose
work STUK contributed, namely:
• Working Group on Operating Experience
(WGOE)
• Working Group on Integrity of Components
and Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organi-
sational Factors (SEG HOF)
• Special Expert Group on Fuel Safety Margins
(SEG FSM).
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Co-operation with the EU
The Atomic Questions Group (AQG), under the
Council of Ministers of the EU, in spring 2001 set
up an ad hoc working group to prepare a report on
the status of the nuclear safety in the EU appli-
cant countries. All EU member countries partici-
pated in it. The EU applicants Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia
and Slovenia use nuclear power. The Finnish rep-
resentative in the working group was from STUK
which has particular expertise in the situation of
countries operating VVER reactors, i.e. Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The
working group prepared a report about the status
of nuclear power plants in each applicant country
and about questions relating to other nuclear fa-
cilities, such as fuel and waste stores, and radia-
tion safety. The report outlines the “high level of
nuclear safety” required of the applicants and
presents applicant-specific recommendations for
the reaching of this level. The report was complet-
ed in May 2001 and the autumn 2001 has been
reserved for replies. A corresponding working
group will be set up to assess the replies in spring
2002.
STUK participated in the work of the following
EU working groups: Nuclear Regulators Working
Group (NRWG), European Radioactive Waste Reg-
ulator’s Forum (ERWR) and European Nuclear
Installations Group (ENIS-G).
STUK contributed to the work of the NRWG
Task Force on Non-Destructive Testing Qualifica-
tion Programmes. The group has been assigned
the task of exchanging authority experiences on
the implementation and development of qualifica-
tion in various European countries and to follow
and assess the second pilot study conducted by the
ENIQ, European Network for Inspection Qualifi-
cation, with the regulator’s point of view in mind.
To exchange experiences the group has drawn up
a member survey. Plans are to report the results
in spring 2002. Observers were appointed to moni-
tor the second pilot study by the ENIQ. Intensive
and active participation is aimed at by giving
feedback to the ENIQ project group from a regula-
tory angle. In addition, STUK participated in the
work of the NRWG Safety Critical Software work-
ing group.
In the field of nuclear material safeguards,
STUK participated in the operation of the Europe-
an Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA). ES-
ARDA’s duty is to promote and harmonise Europe-
an R&D relating to nuclear material control. ES-
ARDA offers a forum for information and ideas
exchange to authorities, researchers and nuclear
power plant operators.
NKS co-operation
The Nordic nuclear safety research programme
NKS 1998–2001 covered three main areas: nucle-
ar safety, emergency response as well as nuclear
threats and dissemination of information; these
were divided into seven projects. STUK’s repre-
sentatives participated in several of them, assum-
ing functions that were in part tasks and semi-
nars. The most essential nuclear safety projects
concered safety analyses, quality assurance and
severe accident investigation.
The programme results were generally of good
quality and scope. They were controlled by project
managers, the NKS Secretary General and a steer-
ing group consisting of representatives from vari-
ous countries and parties. STUK was represented
in the steering group.
The new programme of NKS, to be launched in
2002, was planned. According to the plans the
programme will be directed by two responsible
programme managers instead of the former seven
project managers. STUK headed planning of the
new programme’s sub-area concerning reactor
safety and participated also in the planning of the
emergency preparedness and environmental safe-
ty programme.
Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was an invited mem-
ber of the Reactor Safety Committee assisting SKI.
A representative of SKI was an invited expert in
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety that
functions in conjunction with STUK. Co-operation
with SKI was continued with regular meetings
during which current questions of the regulatory
control of nuclear power plants were discussed.
Information exchange with the Swedish radiation
safety authority (SSI) was continued concerning
doses to Finns who had worked at nuclear power
plants in Sweden and to Swedes who had worked
at Finnish plants. Liaison in emergency situations
was developed in co-operation with SKI and the
SSI.
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A representative of STUK acted as chairman of an
international nuclear safety committee supporting
the Belgian nuclear safety authority and partici-
pated as a permanent member in the work of a
corresponding Lithuanian advisory committee.
STUK’s co-operation with the USNRC focused
on information exchange in nuclear safety matters
of interest to both parties. A co-operation project
was started between STUK, the USNRC and VTT
to improve the thermohydraulics of the FRAP-
TRAN code for fuel transients by coupling with it
a new thermohydraulic code called GENFLO. The
USNRC and STUK signed a co-operation agree-
ment defining the conditions of further pro-
gramme development. Towards the end of 2001 a
representative of STUK went to to work with the
USNRC as a visiting expert.
STUK continued co-operation with the French
nuclear safety authority regarding probabilistic
safety analysis (PSA) and fire risks. The topics of
co-operation were development of the PSA pro-
gramme, fire risk analysis, PSA Level 2, PSA-
based event analysis, emergency operation proce-
dures and harsh weather risk analysis. Fire initia-
tion related statistical data and fire modelling
related research data was obtained from France.
Co-operation between STUK and the Swiss
nuclear safety authority (HSK), closely related to
probabilistic safety analysis (PSA),  was contin-
ued. HSK has in use STUK’s PSA code, among
others. Experiences were exchanged in i.a. code
development, PSA-based event analysis and risk-
assessed inspection. The topics of co-operation
included also quality assurance in regulatory ac-
tivities and final disposal of nuclear waste.
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian
nuclear safety authority (GAN) in the field of
nuclear material and waste control continued
based on a co-operation arrangement signed in
1998.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation
Office (ASNO) was continued. STUK provided
ASNO with information about nuclear materials
imported to and kept in Finland.
Assistance to Central and Eastern European
safety authorities
STUK continued to participate in the assistance
given to radiation safety authorities in Central
and Eastern Europe under financing from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the European Un-
ion as well as from the IAEA.
STUK carries out EU assistance programmes
in association with other EU countries. The follow-
on phase of projects in support of nuclear safety
authorities were launched in Russia and Ukraine
in 2001. Both are one-year projects. A project
concerning the commissioning of RODOS soft-
ware, serving the needs of decision-making in
emergencies, was completed in Hungary. STUK
was responsible for planning the project training
programme. In Lithuania STUK, in co-operation
with the Swedish radiation safety authority (SSI),
prepared a PHARE Twinning project to assist the
Lithuanian radiation safety authority in bringing
practical radiation protection control up to the
level required by EU regulations.
STUK maintained bilateral co-operation pro-
grammes with the nuclear safety authorities of
Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine
with funding provided by the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs for co-operation with neighbouring areas.
STUK maintained close contacts with the resident
inspectors at Leningrad and Kola nuclear power
plants who regularly prepared semi-annual re-
ports on plant events, reporting to STUK the
situation at the plants in question during their
visits to Finland. In addition, the resident inspec-
tor of Leningrad nuclear power plant became
acquainted with the Finnish qualification proce-
dures for nuclear plant operators as well as the
training programmes for operating personnel, the
regulatory control of plant modifications and the
project to develop the emergency instructions of
Loviisa power plant.
In the field of safeguards, STUK closely co-
operated with Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Ukraine. It provided training to coast guards
and customs officials and equipment for the detec-
tion of radioactive materials to help reduce the
smuggling of radioactive materials.
Enhancement of safety at East European
nuclear facilities
STUK administered Finnish-Russian co-operation
in the field of radiation and nuclear safety, funded
from the Finnish government’s budget for co-oper-
ation in neighbouring areas. Kola and Leningrad
nuclear power plants as well as various radioac-
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tive waste storages are the objects of co-operation.
STUK plans the projects together with the recipi-
ents, invites tenders and monitors the progress of
the projects. In addition to the work carried out by
consultants, STUK’s experts actively participate
in safety improvements at the plants.
These projects are a continuation to a long-
term programme that emphasises the quality of
plant operations, fire safety and the integrity of
safety-relevant piping as well emergency response
and environmental radiation monitoring.
Further information on the projects can be
found in the report “Finnish Support Programme
for Nuclear Safety, Bi-Annual Summary 2001” and
also in the corresponding report  “Annual Summa-
ry 2001” to be published in early 2002.
STUK’s representatives worked in expert
groups of the EU and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which
assessed the appropriateness of nuclear safety
improvement projects for which financing is
sought. In support of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs STUK assigned, if necessary, an expert to
the council meetings of the EBRD’s nuclear safety
funds.
In co-operation with GAN and the Radon com-
bine, STUK continued the implementation of pro-
grammes involving the exchange of nuclear waste
management information and experiences.
Additional monitoring instruments have been
installed in the environment of the Kola plant.
The radiation monitoring network there now has
15 automatic measurement stations.
STUK co-operated with the emergency centre
in St Petersburg that is subordinate to the Rus-
sian ministry of energy. In 2001 STUK participat-
ed i.a. in the procurement of a ventilation system
to the emergency centre’s new premises.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
A National Data Centre (NDC), which operates in
conjunction with STUK, is based on the Compre-
hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Centre con-
tributed to the work of the preparatory commis-
sion for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) to establish a cost-
effective and (from a Finnish viewpoint) function-
al organisation. It trained other national data cen-
tres to manage observation of the basic signs of
nuclear test activities. In addition, it trained those
attending to radiation monitoring stations to as-
sure the operation of the stations. The NDC’s own
automatic, routine monitoring was in operation for
the whole year. The NDC observed no abnormal
activity in 2001.
Finland ratified the CTBT on 15 January 1999.
In Finland STUK was assigned the duties of a
National Data Centre, i.e. responsibility for the
verification obligations of the treaty binding the
national authority, i.e. the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs and the international authority, and the
international authority, i.e. CTBTO. The National
Data Centre officially opened on 4 October 1999.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WEN-
RA). STUK’s contribution focused on the work of
the “working group on harmonisation”. The group
has been mapping the harmonisation of the EU
countries’ nuclear safety regulations. Country-spe-
cific self-assessments were completed in 2001 on
the basis of which the group made a comparison of
the fulfilment of nuclear safety “reference require-
ments” in the EU countries. It had earlier drawn
up a report on the reference level for nuclear safe-
ty requirements to be pursued in the EU coun-
tries.
STUK participated in the work of the Network
of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear
Programmes (NERS). NERS is a co-operation fo-
rum where the authorities of small nuclear coun-
tries (Argentine, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland) exchange ex-
periences on the special features of regulatory
efforts relating to small-scale nuclear pro-
grammes. The specific topics of discussion in 2001
were consideration of the public in the use of
nuclear energy, the maintenance of nuclear safety
competence of small countries, safety indicators
and radioactive waste treatment. NERS held one
meeting in 2001.
The VVER Forum, a form of co-operation
among countries operating VVER-type nuclear
facilities, had four working groups in 2001 and
STUK participated in three of them. The working
group on inspection routines visited Khmelnitsk
nuclear power plant in Ukraine. Joint inspections
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facilitate the practical comparison of inspection
procedures and methods used by the authorities of
countries operating VVER facilities. The main
objects of inspection at Khmelnitsk were fire safe-
ty arrangements, plant operational safety and
training activities. In STUK’s contribution the
checking of fire safety arrangements was empha-
sised. The working group on component ageing
management drew up a report about the regulato-
ry experiences gained on steam generator tube
integrity and ageing as well as on preliminary
projects pertaining to the operation of the pre-
stress function of VVER 1000 containments. Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant contributed to the prepara-
tion of the report. The working group made some
proposals for use in service life managment follow-
up work. A third working group into whose work
STUK participated dealt with regulatory inde-
pendence. The VVER Forum had also a working
group on accident management operating in 2001.
The operation of the Loviisa Energy Centre
(LEC) was terminated in 2001. The last meeting of
the DOCUM project, launched at the LEC’s initia-
tive, and whose objective was to develop regula-
tions for the management of the service life of
nuclear facilities, was held in late 2000 and project
follow-up work was agreed upon. In early 2001
STUK and the Russian International Nuclear
Safety Centre (RINSC) prepared summaries of
national regulations and practices. DOCUM meet-
ings planned for 2001 were not held and the
project’s future is unclear due to the termination
of the LEC.
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11 The advisory committee on nuclear safety
In accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear Ener-
gy Act, the preliminary preparation of matters re-
lated to the safe use of nuclear energy is vested
with the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.
The Government appoints the Committee that
functions in conjunction with STUK. The term of
office is three years. The current term of office
ends 15 August 2003.
The Committee’s Chairman is Professor Pentti
Lautala (Technical Research Centre of Finland—
VTT) and its Vice-Chairman is Head of Research
Rauno Rintamaa (VTT) and the members are
Senior Researcher Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (VTT),
Professor Ulla Lähteenmäki (MIKES), Director
Olli Pahkala (Ministry of the Environment), Pro-
fessor Rainer Salomaa (Helsinki University of
Technology), Branch Manager Paavo Vuorela (Ge-
ological Survey of Finland). Professor Jukka Laak-
sonen, Director General of STUK, is a permanent
expert to the Committee. Invited experts are Doc-
tor of Technology Antti Vuorinen and Director
Christer Viktorsson of the Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate.
STUK received several statements from the Com-
mittee. The topics were the application for a deci-
sion in principle concerning the fifth reactor in
planning; the nuclear waste solidification facility
planned in Loviisa; Posiva Oy’s research, develop-
ment and design programme for the final disposal
of spent nuclear fuel; and the national report to be
issued on account of the International Nuclear
Safety Convention. In addition, the Committee
gave its opinion to STUK on several YVL guides,
followed operational events at Finnish and Swed-
ish facilities and made a fact-finding tour of Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant. It convened 13 times dur-
ing 2001.
The Committee has three divisions for prepara-
tory work: a Reactor Safety Division, a Nuclear
Waste Division as well as an Emergency Prepar-
edness and Nuclear Material Division. In addition
to the Committee members proper, distinguished
experts from various fields have been invited to
the Divisions.  A total of 16 Division meetings
were held in 2001.
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Inspection programme 2001
Basic programme Loviisa power plant Olkiluoto power plant
A Safety management X
B Main functions
B1 Safety assessment and improvement X
B2 Operation X
B3 Plant maintenance X X
C Inspections by functional unit and field of know-how
C1 Plant safety functions X X
C2 Electrical and I & C systems X X
C3 Mechanical engineering X X
C4 Construction engineering and structural engineering X X
C5 PSA and utilisation of fault statistics X X
C6 Information management X X
C7 Chemistry X X
C8 Nuclear waste X X
C9 Radiation protection X X
C10 Fire protection X X
C11 Emergency preparedness X X
C12 Physical protection X X
C13 Quality assurance X
APPENDIX 1 PERIODIC INSPECTION PROGRAMME
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APPENDIX 2 LICENCES AND APPROVALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY ACT
C214/227, 10 Jan. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of two fresh nuclear fuel rods from
Germany. Max. 5 kg of uranium with a U-235 en-
richment not exceeding 5%. Provided with the
Euratom control stamp “P”. In addition, obliga-
tions of the Finnish-Russian co-operation agree-
ment on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy apply
to the uranium. Valid until 31 December 2001.
C214/222, 11 Jan. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Germany.
Max. 22 750 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrich-
ment not exeeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom
control stamp “P”. In addition, obligations of the
Finnish-Russian co-operation agreement on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy apply to 25 bun-
dles. Valid until 31 December 2001.
C214/225, 17 Jan. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. Max.
12 800 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment
not exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom con-
trol stamp “P”. In addition, obligations of the Finn-
ish-Russian co-operation agreement on the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy apply to 101 assemblies.
Valid until 31 December 2001.
C214/226, 17 Jan. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. Max
9 250 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment not
exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom control
stamp “N”. In addition, 36 bundles are subject to
obligations agreed upon in correspondence be-
tween Finnish and Chinese authorities. Valid until
31 December 2001.
A214/33, 5 April 2001, Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. Max.
120 tn of uranium with a U-235 enrichment not
exceeding 4%. Provided with the Euratom control
stamp “P”.  In addition, obligations of the Finnish-
Russian co-operation agreement on the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy apply to the uranium. Valid
until 31 December 2005.
A214/33, 5 April 2001, Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Importation and exportation related transporta-
tion of the above-mentioned fresh nuclear fuel.
Valid until 31 December 2005.
C214/228, 22 Nov. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Germany.
Max. 22 750 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrich-
ment not exceeding 5%. Provided with the
Euratom control stamp “P”. In addition, obliga-
tions of the Finnish-Russian co-operation agree-
ment on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy apply
to 118 bundles. Valid until 31 December 2002.
C214/229, 22 Nov. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden.
Max 7 500 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment
not exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom con-
trol stamp “P”. Valid until 31 December 2002.
C214/230, 22 Nov. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden.
Max 12 600 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrich-
ment not exceeding 5%. Provided with the
Euratom control stamp “S”. Valid until 31 Decem-
ber 2002.
C214/231, 22 Nov. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Importation of fresh nuclear fuel from Germany.
Max 850 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment
not exceeding 5%. In addition, four bundles are
subject to obligations agreed upon in correspond-
ence between Finnish and Chinese authorities.
Valid until 31 December 2002.
C821/76, 19 Dec. 2001, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
The handing over to Ekokem Oy of a 9m3 batch of
waste oil to be cleared from regulatory control.
The oil is from Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and
will be used for saw chain oil. Valid until 30 June
2002.
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APPENDIX 3 STATEMENTS BY STUK AND DECISIONS ON NPP STAFF
Statements by STUK
A811/29, C811/21, 17 January 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on the nuclear waste management programme for
2001 of Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum Power
and Heat Oy
Y211/7, 8 February 2001
A preliminary safety evaluation of the fifth reac-
tor unit in planning to the Ministry of Trade and
Industry
F214/9, 26 February 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on VTT Chemical Technology’s application for a
licence for the multiple exportation and importa-
tion of fission chambers within the EU.
55/750/01, 28 May 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants
(DS 291)”
60/750/01, 15 June 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Recruitment, Qualification and Traning of
Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants (DS 287)”
62/750/01, 26 June 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: External events in relation to NPP design
(DS 301)”
74/750/01, 31 July 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Fuel handling and storage systems in NPPs
(DS 276)”
76/750/01, 20 September 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Seismic Hazard Evaluation for Nuclear
Power Plants (DS 302)”
78/750/01, 24 September 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Emergency
Power systems at Nuclear Power Plants” (DS 303)”
78/750/01, 24 September 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Meteorolog-
ical Events in Site Evaluation for Nucleaar Power
Plants (DS 184)”
Y811/35, 27 September 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on Posiva Oy’s research, development and design
programme and design programme for the period
preceding the construction of a final disposal facil-
ity for spent fuel.
Y214/56, 17 October 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on Fortum Nuclear Service Oy’s licence applica-
tion for software exportation to the IAEA and
Egypt in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act
82/750/01, 18 October 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Seismic Design and Component Qualifica-
tion for Nuclear Power Plants (DS 304)”
82/750/01, 18 October 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Flood Hazard for Nuclear Power Plants on
Coastal and River Sides (DS 280)”
81/750/01, 31 October 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power
Plants (DS 307)”
86/750/01, 20 November 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Reactor Coolant and Associated Systems in
Nuclear Power Plants (DS 282)”
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C812/29, 14 November 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s financial provision for
nuclear waste management
A812/28, 14 November 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s financial provi-
sion for nuclear waste management
A812/26, 14 November 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on VTT’s financial provision for nuclear waste
management of the FiR 1 research reactor
89/750/01, 20 December 2001
A statement on the IAEA draft guide “Safety
Guide: Reactor Core Design in NPPs (DS 283)”
P214-5/16, 20 December 2001
A statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
on VTT Mineral Technology’s licence application
for the exportation to Estonia of ore concentrate
(pyrochlore concentrate) containing uranium and
thorium.
Decisions on NPP staff
P214-1/11, 5 February 2001
At the application of the Helsinki University De-
partment of Chemistry’s Laboratory of Radio-
chemistry, STUK approved Ms Sinikka Pinnoja as
the deputy manager responsible for activities per-
taining to nuclear materials at the laboratory.
F113/9, 12 February 2001
At the application of VTT Chemical Technology,
STUK approved persons to act as FiR 1 research
reactor foremen or operators until 31 December
2003.
P214-1/12, 29 November 2001
At the application of the Helsinki University De-
partment of Chemistry’s Laboratory of Radio-
chemistry, STUK approved Ms Kerttuli Helariutta
as the manager responsible for activities pertain-
ing to nuclear materials at the laboratory.
A113/108, 29 March 2001; A113/111, 21 May 2001;
A113/112, 25 May 2001; A113/113, 3 July 2001;
A113/114, 31 October 2001; A113/117, 18 Decem-
ber 2001; A113/118; 21 December 2001
At the application of Fortum Power and Heat Oy,
STUK approved persons in the applicant’s employ
to act as shift managers or operators at the Lovii-
sa plant units.
C113/173, 29 March 2002; C113/174, 10 May 2001;
C113/175, 27 June 2001; C113/177, 27 June 2001;
C113/179, 4 October 2001; C113/180, 24 October
2001; C113/181, 27 November 2001; C113/182, 19
December 2001
At the application of Teollisuuden Voima Oy,
STUK approved persons in the applicant’s employ
to act as shift managers or operators at the
Olkiluoto plant units.
STATEMENTS BY STUK AND DECISIONS ON NPP STAFF APPENDIX 3
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APPENDIX 4 SAFETY RESEARCH PROJECTS COMPLETED IN 2001
Nuclear power plants
FINNUS—the Finnish Research Programme
on NPP Safety
Ageing and failure mechanisms of modern I&C
equipment; VTT Automation
Comparison of the FRAPTRAN and SCANAIR
codes; VTT Energy
Thermal stratification in NPP pipes; VTT Energy
A method for identifying, modelling and propabil-
istically assessing human commission errors, a
continuation project; VTT Automation
Development of structural analysis methods for
fracture mechanisms; VTT Manufacturing Tech-
nology
Safety assessment of programmable automation, a
continuation project; VTT Automation
Modelling of oxide film behaviour and their role in
activity buildup and in different corrosion phe-
nomena at NPPs, a continuation project;  Manu-
facturing Technology
Reliability assessment and licensing methodology
of passive systems, a continuation project; VTT
Automation
Development of fuel analysis capabilities; valida-
tion of FRAPTRAN-code; VTT Energy
Fuel cladding corrosion mechanisms and their
modelling, a continuation project; VTT Manufac-
turing Technology
Effect of smoke and heat on electronic equipment,
modelling of fires for risk analysis, active fire pro-
tection equipment; VTT Building Technology
The factors influencing the containment integrity
test results; VTT Energy
Development of methods for small specimen
toughness characterisation of irradiated materi-
als; VTT Manufacturing
In-service inspections and condition monitoring:
Development of qualification of NDT methods;
VTT Manufacturing
In-service inspections and condition monitoring:
Development of ultrasonic simulation and model-
ling capabilities; VTT Manufacturing
Developing working practises and culture in daily
operations; VTT Automation
TRAB-3D code; code verification, a continuation
project; VTT Energy
Criticality safety of fuel transportation container;
VTT Energy
The application of new reactor physics models in
criticality safety calculations; VTT Energy
Environmentally assisted cracking of NPP materi-
als, a continuation project; VTT Manufacturing
Technology
Research supporting regulation
The distribution of sea water level; Finnish Insti-
tute of Marine Research
The release and behavior of ruthenium in severe
reactor accidents; VTT Chemical Technology
The prescriptivity and consistency of nuclear safe-
ty regulation; VTT Automation
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The organisms of sea water effecting the nuclear
safety; Finnish Institute of Marine Research
The selection of NPP siting and  environmental
risks, VTT Energy
Studies in concrete technology for the construc-
tion, inspection and repairing of NPP structures, a
continuation project; VTT Building Technology
The requirements of NPP containment coating;
VTT Building Technology
Nuclear waste management
Research supporting regulation
The computational modelling of the mechanical
and physical processes of a nuclear waste reposi-
tory. HUT, Laboratory of Theoretical and Applied
Mechanics.
Groundwater flow paths. Fracture characteriza-
tion of a road cut. Geological Survey of Finland.
Interpretation and characterisation of fracture
zones at Olkiluoto site by focussed modelling. Ge-
ological Survey of Finland.
Uranium series study. University of Helsinki, Lab-
oratory of Radiochemistry.
Matrix diffusion research: Indications of radionu-
clide transport in a postglacial weathering profile
(natural analogue investigation).  University of
Helsinki, Laboratory of Radiochemistry.
Matrix diffusion cluster; Treatment of geosphere
retention processes in safety assessments: meas-
urement and modelling of matrix diffusion. Uni-
versité de Poitiers/HYDRASA.
Interpretation of disturbance structures in
Holocene submarine sediments in the Olkiluoto
area, the Gulf of Bothnia, Baltic Sea, using a high
resolution echo-sounding profiles.  Geological Sur-
vey of Finland.
The Definition of Irradiated Fuel (for Safeguards).
Redox buffering and uranium retardation in nu-
clear waste repository. University of Catalonia.
Treatment of geosphere retention processes in
safety assessments:  measurement and modeling
of matrixdiffusion (“Matrix Diffusion Cluster”).
University of Helsinki, Laboratory of Radiochem-
istry.
Expert assessment
Review of Posiva’s R&D programme; University of
Aberdeen (Prof. F.P. Glasser).
Contribution to international research
projects
Electrochemical and electric properties of surface
films on copper in simulated groundwater. VTT
Manufacturing Technology.
DECOVALEX III—Bench Mark Test 2 simula-
tions. Work done in 2000. University of Uppsala
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic Shield in Finland as indicators of nuclear waste
repository safety. Work done in 2001. Geological
Survey of Finland.
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic Shield in Finland as indicators of nuclear waste
repository safety; The use of selected safety indica-
tors (concentrations, fluxes) in the assessment of
radioactive waste disposal. University of St. Pe-
tersburg.
SAFETY RESEARCH PROJECTS COMPLETED IN 2001 APPENDIX 4
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IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic Shield in Finland as indicators of nuclear waste
repository safety; Dispersion haloes and fluxes of
chemical elements in the cryolithozone (perma-
frost or periglacial regions). University of St. Pe-
tersburg.
DECOVALEX III—Thermal studies for FEBEX
experiment. Work done in 2001. HUT, Laboratory
of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics.
DECOVALEX III—BMT3 permafrost modelling.
Work done in 2001.  HUT, Laboratory of Theoreti-
cal and Applied Mechanics.
DECOVALEX III—BMT2 rock mechanical simula-
tions in 2001. HUT, Laboratory of Rock Engineering.
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Loviisa 1 annual maintenance
The Loviisa 1 refuelling and maintenance outage
started on 11 August 2001 and ended on 31 Au-
gust 2001. The plant unit was off the grid for about
20 days. The outage was four days longer than
planned, which was due to an investigation into
the causes of vibrations in the primary coolant
pumps and the replacement of one pump. The
pump vibrations are described in more detail in
Appendix 6. In addition to refuelling, outage work
included maintenance and modification of compo-
nents, structures and systems. Safety-significant
modifications are described in Appendix 7.
Both Loviisa plant units introduced new proce-
dures for main control room operations during
annual maintenance to provide for well-defined
and undisturbed  circumstances for operators and
other persons working in the control room. In
addition, a new plant safety instruction was intro-
duced to systematically assure a sufficient plant
safety systems availability during annual mainte-
nance.
During the outage radiation dose rates in some
primary circuit locations were 25–40% above nor-
mal level. This may partly have been due to a
change in the water chemistry of the primary
circuit. A process coupling different from the one
usually used for shutdown prior to an annual
maintenance outage was employed during this
shutdown because a valve had failed. The higher-
than-normal radiation dose rates had no signfi-
cant bearing on occupational dose rates, however.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
for Loviisa 1 was 0.70 manSv. According to guide-
lines set by STUK, the threshold value for the
collective dose for a Loviisa plant unit is 1.22
manSv averaged over two successive years. The
annual collective radiation dose is mostly incurred
in outage work. The highest individual dose dur-
ing the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance of 2001 was
11.5 mSv. The Radiation Decree prescribes that
the annual effective dose to a radiation worker
may not exceed 50 mSv. About 900 persons in-
volved in the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance out-
age were subject to personnel monitoring. Fig.
A5.1 of this Appendix gives the collective occupa-
tional doses incurred in maintenance work over
the past years.
Figure A5.1. Collective occupational doses incurred during the annual maintenance of Loviisa and
Olkiluoto plant units..
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Loviisa 2 annual maintenance
Loviisa 2 was shut down for refuelling and main-
tenance from 1 to 23 September 2001. The plant
unit’s start-up was postponed by about six days
from the planned date mainly because of an inves-
tigation into the causes of primary coolant pump
vibrations. The unit was off the grid for about 22
days. In addition to refuelling, outage work includ-
ed maintenance and modification of components,
structures and systems the most important of
which are described in Appendix 7.
A leak of mildly radioactive water occurred
within the plant unit during the annual mainte-
nance. The event is described in Appendix 6.
The collective radiation dose incurred from
outage work was 0.29 manSv. The highest individ-
ual radiation dose was 4.4 mSv. About 900 persons
involved in the outage were subject to personnel
monitoring. Fig. A5.1 of this Appendix gives the
collective occupational doses accumulated in main-
tenance work over the past years.
In connection with the regulatory control of
mechanical components and structures it was not-
ed that the Loviisa plant’s inspection unit “Inspec-
tion Body Loviisa NPP” had proceeded incorrectly
during one inspection. The structural inspection of
a primary coolant pump sealing water system
heat exchanger modification was carried out by an
inspector who lacked the required STUK-granted
inspection authorisation. The inspection protocol
was drawn up by an “Inspection Body Loviisa
NPP” inspector who had the required authorisa-
tion. The licencee provided STUK with a report on
the incorrect procedure and the measures that
followed. STUK assessed the measures and con-
sidered them appropriate and sufficient.
Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance
Olkiluoto 1 was shut down for refuelling on 21 - 29
May 2001. The plant unit was off the grid for about
eight days. An erroneous neutron flux control sys-
tem signal actuated the reactor scram function in
the plant unit shutdown phase. The control rods
had already been inserted into the reactor and,
thus, no actual scram occurred. In addition to Te-
ollisuuden Voima Oy’s own personnel, the number
of external workers contributing to the annual
maintenance outage was 640 at its most. In addi-
tion to refuelling, outage work included mainte-
nance and modification of some components, struc-
tures and systems. Safety-significant plant modifi-
cations are described in Appendix 7.
Significant maintenance items included the re-
placement, inspection and testing of valve actua-
tors needed in an accident situation. In the au-
tumn 2000, damage and cracks had been observed
in the bakelite gears of the reactor core emergency
cooling system actuators, which might have pre-
vented valve operation according to design. The
event is described in Appendix 6.
During the outage, the licencee inspected those
emergency cooling system pipe sections inside the
reactor pressure vessel in which cracking induced
by thermal fatigue had been observed in 1998 and
1999 (STUK-B-YTO 184, 1999 and STUK-B-196,
1999). The cracks were repaired and the pipes
fitted with thermal shields to prevent further
cracking. In the inspections now conducted, the
slight movement of one thermal shield was detect-
ed. The shield had moved before and had been re-
tightened during the 2000 annual maintenance.
Since the repair method used in 2000 was insuffi-
cient and the work requires divers—and increases
worker radiation exposure—the licencee is work-
ing to come up with an improved solution by the
2002 annual maintenance for keeping the thermal
shield in place. STUK approved the postponement
of the shield’s re-tightening until the 2002 annual
maintenance outage because it’s total shifting dur-
ing plant unit operation is quite unlikely. The
shield’s observed minor dislocation does not essen-
tially increase the risk of thermal fatigue in the
emergency coolant pipes.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
was 0.27 manSv. According to guidelines set by
STUK, the threshold value for the collective dose
for an Olkiluoto plant unit is 2.10 manSv. The
annual collective radiation dose is mostly incurred
in outage work. The highest individual dose dur-
ing the Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance of 2001
was 8.8 mSv. The highest individual radiation dose
incurred during the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 annual
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maintenance outages was 11.5 mSv. Fig. A5.1 of
this Appendix gives the collective occupational
doses accumulated in maintenance work over the
past years.
Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance
Olkiluoto 2 underwent annual maintenance from
6 to 21 May 2001. It was off the grid for about 15
days. In addition to Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s own
personnel, the number of external workers con-
tributing to the annual maintencance outage was
800 at its most. In addition to refuelling, outage
work included maintenance and modification of
components, structures and systems. Safety-sig-
nificant plant modifications are described in Ap-
pendix 7.
The actuators of valves needed in accidents
were replaced, inspected and tested at Olkiluoto 2
as well. The work is described in more detail in
Appendix 6.
Important outage work included the repair of a
few square metres of sea water tunnel floor con-
crete structure in which cracking had occurred
owing to reinforcement steel corrosion. The corro-
sion was caused by sea water salt and a mistake
made during the construction phase since the con-
crete layer protecting the steel was very thin origi-
nally. The corrosion protection system for rein-
forcement steels, installed in the sea water tun-
nels during annual maintenance, is described in
Appendix 7.
The collective radiation dose incurred in work
during the outage was 0.72 manSv. The highest
individual radiation dose during the Olkiluoto 2
annual maintenance outage of 2001 was 7.8 mSv.
Fig. A5.1 of this Appendix gives the collective
occupational doses accumulated in maintenance
work at the Olkiluoto plant units over the past
years.
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Loviisa power plant
Ventilation system of Loviisa 1 diesel
generator room partially inoperable
On 23 October 2000 a 2-weekly diesel generator
functional test revealed that the fans of one ther-
mostatically operated air cooling unit of the Lovii-
sa 1 diesel generator room failed to start. An erro-
neous coupling of the thermostat was repaired in
three days in compliance with the Technical Speci-
fications. In addition, a work order was submitted
to inspect the control function of air cooling units
of three other diesel generator rooms. In January
2001 it was found out that inspections in accord-
ance with the work order had not been made. They
were made in January/February and revealed no
operationally significant defects.
The fresh air fans of the diesel generator room
ventilation system and three air-cooling units are
normally on standby. They are set into action by
thermostats when the room temperature rises.
During a fire or the inoperability of the fresh air
fans, service water cooled air-cooling units are
used.
Due to the erroneous thermostat coupling, the
fans of the air-cooling unit that would start at
highest temperature would not have automatical-
ly started; however, they would have been availa-
ble by manual control. Two other air cooling units
and the fresh air fans would have operated accord-
ing to design. The cause of the erroneous coupling
has not been identified. Although nothing out of
the ordinary had been observed during earlier
testing, the fans could have been inoperable for a
long time since their operation has not been relia-
bly verified during testing. The event is of minor
safety significance because, in case of the loss of
the external grid, three other diesel generators
would have supplied reserve power if the diesel in
operation had been made inoperable by high die-
sel generator room temperature. The event was
classified INES Level 0.
The testing instructions of the air cooling units
were made more specific by the utility. In the 2001
annual maintenance outage, one thermostat regu-
lating the temperature of one diesel generator
room was replaced by a newer type of thermostat
and the coupling of the control circuit of another
diesel generator was changed to correspond to the
starting order of the fans.
Loviisa 1 reactor scram
A power supply malfunction occurred at Loviisa 1
on 9 February 2001 when disconnected cables in
the instrumentation room of the control building
were being removed from service. In an I & C sys-
tem modification in 1986, four cables had re-
mained connected to the plant protection system
cubicles by mistake and were thus partly live. The
cutting of a live cable was followed by a short
circuit that closed nine isolation valves of the con-
tainment building among others. When the opera-
tor noticed the situation he manually scrammed
the reactor. The plant unit was operating at full
power at the time of the event.
The power supply, which was cut off by the
short circuit, was resumed in about nine minutes
and the closed isolation valves were opened.
When the isolation valve of the primary circuit
make-up system return line closed, the circuit’s
safety valve to the steam generator room opened.
After the scram the operator tripped the primary
coolant pumps and closed some control valves in
order to close the open safety valve. When an
isolation valve in the control rod cooling system
was closed the system’s safety valve in the steam
generator room opened. The valve’s closing im-
paired control rod drive cooling but the tempera-
ture increase was insignificant because the cooling
system was out of operation for eight minutes
only. The other closed isolation valves required no
immediate action.
Ca. 1.2 m3  of primary circuit water entered the
floor drains of the steam generator room via the
safety valves. The water was channelled to a water
treatment system tank.
Cable ends were unwound and isolated and the
operation of the containment building isolation
valves tested. The plant unit was re-synchronised
with the national grid on 10 February 2001. The
steam generator room was checked prior to the
plant unit’s start-up. The event was classified
INES Level 0. As a further measure the utility
improved the cable removal procedures.
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Control rods were inserted deeper into the
Loviisa 1 reactor core than allowed by the
Technical Specifications
During a Loviisa 1 reactor start-up on 10 Febru-
ary 2001, after a reactor scram on 9 February
2001, one control rod group was inserted, for ca.
four hours, deeper into the reactor core than al-
lowed by the Technical Specifications. Consequent-
ly, the fuel operating limits were slightly exceeded.
The 37 control rods in the reactor of the Loviisa
plant units are divided into six groups, only one of
which is inserted into the reactor during normal
operation to control reactor power. The maximum
limit on the insertion of the rod group into the
reactor core is given in the Technical Specifica-
tions. It ensures the maintenance of fuel operating
limits and a sufficient shutdown margin.
The reactor had been in a shutdown state for
about 14 hours prior to the post-scram start-up.
Due to certain reactor physical phenomena, the
reactor’s operational state in that case promotes a
slow power increase. In a case such as this the
inserted control rod group tends to compensate for
the power increase by inserting itself deeper into
the reactor core, unless the power increase is
prevented by the injection of a sufficient amount
of neutron-absorbing boric-acid water into the
reactor. Boric-acid water was injected into the
reactor on several occasions during the start-up,
but far too carefully, whereupon the control rods
moved too deep into the reactor.
The event was caused by the fact that, owing to
the infrequency of the situation, the need to inject
into the reactor a large amount of boric-acid water
as well as the effect of the power increase on the
reactor status at the time of the event were not
sufficiently well understood by the operating shift.
The previous Loviisa 1 post-scram start-up had
been in 1994. The plant unit has instructions for
such situations but the night shift on duty at the
time of the start-up failed to properly read them to
understand what procedures should have been
taken, which was due to other pressures related to
the reactor start-up.
The fuel operating limits were so slightly ex-
ceeded that the event had no safety significance. It
was assigned INES Level 0.
After the event the utility intensified operator
training and improved the control room display
and alarm systems used by operators in the con-
trol room.
Primary coolant pump vibrations and
cracks in the supporting structures of the
pumps’ vanes at Loviisa 1 and 2
During the servicing of primary coolant pumps in
the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage cracks
were observed in the supporting structure of one
pump’s guide vanes. This pump had been added to
the maintenance programme because, during a
modification, water had entered its surrounding
structures. It was suspected, however, that vibra-
tions during plant start-up and shutdown had
caused the cracks because such vibrations had
damaged supporting structures previously. After
the previous outage vibrations had been observed
in another primary coolant pump as well, which
was included in the maintenance programme. Sim-
ilarly, a pump outside the annual maintenance
programme was inspected during the Loviisa 2
annual maintenance due to vibrations observed in
it. Corresponding cracks were detected in both
pumps. Damaged components were replaced by
spare parts and vibration monitoring was in-
creased.
Despite the improvements made, vibrations
were observed even during post-outage start-ups.
At Loviisa 1 vibrations occurred in two other
primary coolant pumps and they ended before the
plant unit was operating at full power. At Loviisa 2
a vibrating pump had to be replaced for which
procedure the plant unit had to be cooled again to
a shutdown state. No vibrations were observed
during the new start-up.
Both Loviisa plant units have six primary cool-
ant pumps. The problem of cracked supporting
structures was first observed in 1995. The break-
ing of a structure at Loviisa 2 brought about a
primary coolant pump malfunction and the shut-
down of the plant unit for repairs (STUK-B-YTO
149, 1996). In consequence of the event, the flow
direction of the loop in question had reversed, and
loosened components had been transported away
from the reactor towards the steam generator. In
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the 1997 annual maintenance outage, correspond-
ing cracks were detected in one Loviisa 1 primary
coolant pump (STUK-B-YTO 169, 1998).
The cause of the damage and its elimination
are still under examination. During the 1995 an-
nual maintenance outage metallurgical studies
were conducted demonstrating that crack growth
and the final fracturing of the structure were due
to vibration fatigue. A new study made during the
2001 annual maintenance outage confirmed this
observation despite the fact that, since the year
1995, all supporting structures had been replaced
with ones having better fatigue resistance. Even
more durable structures are under design. In
addition, stresses arising from temperature differ-
ences and the effects of the reactor coolant cir-
cuit’s hydraulic behaviour are being scrutinised.
A leak of mildly radioactive water during
Loviisa 2 annual maintenance
During the annual maintenance outage, on 8 Sep-
tember 2001, a make-up system water tank over-
flowed and 4.7 m3 of water escaped to the emer-
gency coolant pump rooms. At the time of the
event, mildly radioactive water from the reactor
pool was being pumped via the pool water purifi-
cation plant to the tank that was quite full al-
ready. The 1000 m3 capacity emergency make-up
tank is used to store up water from the primary
circuit, or systems connecting to it, during outag-
es. In emergencies the boric-acid water contained
in the tank is used to cool down the reactor.
The water flow routes and the emergency cool-
ant pump rooms were decontaminated and the
motors of pumps located in the rooms were
checked. No significant soak damage was observed
in the inspection but water had splashed on some
motors. To dry them up, the pumps were run for
about an hour.
The spilled water’s activity was ca. 4000 Bq/l,
i.e. it’s total activity was ca. 18.8 MBq. The event
and the decontamination after it did not cause
significant radiation doses to the personnel.
The overflow occurred because it was not en-
sured by calculations that there would be enough
room in the tank for the amount of water to be
transferred and because the tank’s water level
was not monitored carefully enough. In addition,
the operators did not immediately react to an
alarm signal indicating a high water level in the
tank. To prevent recurrence, a condition will be
added to the procedure instructions requiring that
the accommodation of the amount of water to be
transferred be checked prior to the transfer and,
further, that the alarm signal indicating a high
water level in the tank be given a high priority.
The event was rated INES Level 0.
A crack in the shroud tube of a control rod
drive of the Loviisa 2 reactor
During a once–a–month checking round at Loviisa
2, on 18 December 2001, crystallised boron was
found in structures above the reactor pressure ves-
sel. The boron originated in primary circuit water
and was an indication of a primary circuit water
leak. Crystallised boron had accumulated on the
surface of a temperature detector pocket welded
on a control rod drive shroud. The control rod
shrouds, attached to the reactor pressure vessel
lid by bolted joints, are part of the primary cir-
cuit’s pressure-retaining boundary.
In ultrasonic inspections the next day, a crack
penetrating the control rod shroud wall was found
from beneath the detector pocket. Through this
crack, boron containing primary circuit water had
accessed the detector pocket, ending up on the
structure’s surface.
The plant unit was placed in cold shutdown on
19 December 2001 for repairs. The detector pocket
was removed and the surface of the control rod
shroud was polished prior to surface inspection. A
crack with multiple branches was observed under
the pocket. In addition, an individual surface crack
was found below the pocket area. This crack was
removed by grinding. The through-wall crack area
was temporarily fixed by welding a pressure-
retaining band structure on it.
During the outage, the wall area of 25 easily
accessible detector pockets out of a total of 37
shrouds above the reactor lid were also inspected
by ultrasound. The signs of a minor surface defect
were found in one of them, which required no
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measures. After repairs and inspections were com-
pleted, the plant unit resumed power generation
on 22 December 2001.
The event was classified INES Level 0.
The temporarily fixed shroud tube will be replaced
by a spare part in a 2002 maintenance outage. The
tube to be removed will be examined in order to
determine what caused the cracking. Both plant
units will also enhance monitoring of the points in
question.
A position switch of a containment under-
pressure valve was inoperative at Loviisa 1
A periodic test at Loviisa 1 on 14 December 2001
revealed a defective position switch in a contain-
ment underpressure valve. The switch relates to
severe accident management. The Technical Speci-
fications require that it must be in working order
during plant unit operation. Relevant Technical
Specifications requirements came into effect dur-
ing the plant unit’s start-up from annual mainte-
nance in August 2001.
A containment underpressure system prevents
buckling during events involving a significant
underpressure within the containment. The sys-
tem’s underpressure valves automatically open,
when necessary. Their position switches transmit
data on valve positions to the control room. Data
transmission has been assured by means of addi-
tional switches operating even in severe accident
conditions. The position switches do not control
the operation of systems or components. The
valves’ switches, which transmit regular position
data, were in operating order and the control room
was thus aware of the valve’s condition all the
time.
The installation of additional switches had
been part of an ongoing long-term project to im-
prove severe accident management. The Technical
Specifications were ignored due to a break in the
flow of information between the line organisation
and the project organisation carrying out the
work.
The event was of minor safety significance and
its INES classification is Level 0.
Owing to the event, the utility plans to improve
procedures relating to the management of modifi-
cations onsite. The flow of information between
the project and line organisations will be en-
hanced, among others, and training given to the
facility personnel on the bases and purpose of the
Technical Specifications will be increased.
Olkiluoto power plant
Reliability of reactor core emergency
cooling at Olkiluoto plant units diminished
due to valve actuator malfunctions
Defects and cracks had been observed in the
bakelite gears of the actuators of valves control-
ling reactor core cooling in accidents. Due to them,
the valves might not have operated if needed. The
event was classified INES Level 1. The gears were
replaced with brass gears.
The reactor core cooling system comprises four
identical sub-systems for injecting emergency cool-
ant into the reactor at low pressure to compensate
for a primary circuit leak. In such a situation the
reactor water level is controlled by opening and
closing sub-system valves that are, at the same
time, containment building external isolation
valves. One operating subsystem is sufficient to
ensure successful emergency cooling. In most acci-
dents the reactor core cooling system may be
compensated for by the auxiliary feed water sys-
tem.
The valve actuator problem first appeared on
14 August 2000 when a coolant-regulating valve
failed to open in a periodic test at Olkiluoto 1:
some teeth in the bakelite gear of its valve actua-
tor had broken. A corresponding actuator from the
storage was installed in its place. A corresponding
valve in another sub-system of the reactor core
cooling system failed to close in a periodic test on
11 December 2000. Teeth had broken off the
bakelite gear of the valve actuator as well. Since
there were no new bakelite gears or replacement
actuators in storage, the damaged gear was re-
placed by a brass gear made according to draw-
ings.
Due to recurring failures the licencee decided
to continue the replacement of bakelite gears with
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brass ones made onsite. The only actuator in store,
removed from Olkiluoto 1 in August, was fitted
with a brass gear on 3 January 2001. It was then
installed for use in Olkiluoto 1. The bakelite gear
of the actuator, removed from the plant unit, was
inspected by penetrant testing that revealed four
crack initiations. In addition, a gear removed from
the plant unit in December was checked by the
same method. In addition to the broken teeth,
cracks were identified in three teeth.
Based on the inspection results, the schedule
for substituting brass gears for the old ones at
Olkiluoto 2 was speeded up and the first replace-
ment was made on 11 January 2001. The gear
detached from the actuator had several cracks,
one reaching the middle of a tooth. The tooth in
question was tested for durability in a test bench
the same day. Nothing out of the ordinary was
detected in the functional test. In an inspection
after the test, however, the worst cracked tooth
was found to have broken.
After the inspections and replacements had
been completed there was reason to suspect the
operability of the external isolation valves in three
Olkiluoto 2 and two Olkiluoto 1 sub-systems. At
Olkiluoto 2 this meant that, if the reliable opera-
tion of the valves could not be ensured, the opera-
tion of the plant unit would have to be stopped
within 24 hours to comply with the Technical
Specifications. According to the Technical Specifi-
cations, Olkiluoto 1, where the operability of only
two sub-system valves had been questioned, had
three days to repair the failures prior to having to
shut down the plant unit. At Olkiluoto 2 the
bakelite gears of the actuators were replaced with
brass ones during the night of January 11 to 12,
2001 and at Olkiluoto 1 in the afternoon of Janu-
ary 12, 2001.
Material technological analyses of what had
caused the failure of the bakelite gears were
made. The cracking was probably due to fatigue.
The analyses yielded no proof of material ageing.
Corresponding faults had been observed at facili-
ties abroad in the 1980’s and 1990’s and one case
at Olkiluoto facility as well. However, Olkiluoto
had taken no measures due to these individual
cases.
Owing to the event the licencee further specified
the procedures and instructions for valve actua-
tors. In the 2001 annual maintenance outage at
Olkiluoto 1 the bakelite gear of one valve actuator
was replaced with a new bakelite gear and the
gears of two actuators were checked. In an
Olkiluoto 2 outage the gears of four actuators were
replaced with new bakelite gears and the removed
gears were checked. They were in good condition
and had no cracks. In addition, one actuator hav-
ing a new bakelite gear underwent functional test-
ing in a test bench to establish its durability. Post-
testing inspections found the gear was in good
condition. The follow-up and replacement of valve
actuators containing bakelite gears and of their
gears will continue in the coming years.
Olkiluoto 2 reactor scram
A reactor scram in consequence of a turbine-relat-
ed operational malfunction occurred at Olkiluoto 2
on 21 March 2001. Safety systems operated as de-
signed.
The malfunction was caused by a failure of the
level measurement of a drainage tank on the
turbine side. The failed measurement function
indicated, without cause, too low a level in the
tank, leading to a bypass of one high pressure pre-
heater line of the reactor feed water system and a
partial reactor scram. In the partial scram, some
control rods were hydraulically inserted into the
reactor core, decreasing the reactor power to ca.
20% level. Owing to the bypass, the temperature
of water injected into the reactor dropped and,
consequently, the reactor power began to rise in a
way typical of a BWR.  Power exceeded 56 per cent
in two out of four measurement points assessing
power. A reactor scram followed and all control
rods were hydraulically inserted into the reactor
core and reactor power dropped to zero. The event
resulted in a reactor scram because the partial
scram function was not sufficient in this situation
to maintain reactor power below the 56 per cent
scram threshold.
The failed level measurement device was re-
placed and the plant unit was re-synchronised
with the national grid on 22 March 2001. The
event was classified INES Level 0.
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The licencee carried out the necessary measures
to enhance the scram function at both plant units
during annual maintenance outages.
Situations in non-compliance with the
Technical Specifications at Olkiluoto 2
during a modification of the reactor control
rod manoeuvring and position indication
system
Two situations occurred during the Olkiluoto 2
annual maintenance outage during which the
plant unit was in non-compliance with the Techni-
cal Specifications. In one of them, an automatic
function preventing the withdrawal of control rods
had been bypassed, i.e. removed from operational
readiness, and in the other, data on control rod
positions in the reactor, which should have been
available in the control room, was lacking. The
events occurred during a modification of the reac-
tor’s rod control and rod position indication sys-
tem. The modifications are described in Appen-
dix 7.
A bypass of the automated function preventing
control rod withdrawal occurred during refuelling
when functional tests of the revised system were
carried out simultaneously with reactor core inter-
nal fuel transfers. The licencee on 13 May 2001
applied for STUK’s permission to bypass the screw
shutdown function during functional testing, since
the tests could not otherwise have been done.
Automated screw shutdown assures the hydraulic
scram function, which drives control rods into the
reactor core by means of electric motors during a
scram situation, if necessary. The Technical Speci-
fications require that the screw shutdown function
be tripped during core internal fuel transfers. In
the morning of 14 May 2001 STUK’s inspectors
noticed that during the functional tests of the
reactor control rod manoeuvring and position indi-
cation system, which had been conducted so far, it
had been necessary to also bypass automation
preventing reactor control rod withdrawal. The
Technical Specifications require that it must be in
full operational readiness during refuelling,
among others. The automation is intended to pre-
vent control rod withdrawal that could lead to
unintentional criticality.
The event was attributed to an erroneous inter-
pretation of the Technical Specifications. It was
assumed to be partly due to an event two days
previously on 11 May 2001 when, after an electri-
cal separation, the control room had lost data on
all rod positions in the reactor. The Technical Spec-
ifications were interpreted in such a way onsite
that functional testing of the rod control and rod
position indication system could be continued in
the situation in question. It was noted later that
rod position data should have been restored and
STUK’s permission asked to continue work. The
requirements of the Technical Specifications were
thus deviated from also during this event.
The bypassing of automation preventing con-
trol rod withdrawal or the lacking control rod
position data had no safety significance in practice
in the situation in question because all control
rods were fully inserted into the core and, to
prevent their manoeuvring, the fuses of their
drives had been removed and their electric break-
ers opened. STUK on 14 May 2001 approved, on
the basis of the utility’s application, the bypassing
of automation preventing rod withdrawal for the
rest of the functional testing of the the rod control
and rod position indication system.
The events were assigned Level 0 on the
INES.
Improvements identified as necessary by event
analysis are due for implementation prior to the
realisation of corresponding installation work at
Olkiluoto 1 in 2002.
Inoperability of two reactor feed water
conductivity measurements at Olkiluoto 2
The operators of Olkiluoto 2 on 23 May 2001 ob-
served, based on process computer trend monitor-
ing, that two reactor feed water conductivity meas-
urements displayed erroneous values. Trouble-
shooting indicated that conductivity transmitters
did not send signals, which rendered the measure-
ments inoperable. Disconnected electrical connec-
tors were connected and the measurements were
restored to operation the same day. They were in-
operable for about three days.
The conductivity of water injected into the
reactor is continuously measured at four measure-
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ment points. High conductivity indicates a service
water leak in the turbine condenser. If the conduc-
tivity of feed water exceeds a limit value, the
transmitters give out a signal closing the valves of
the feed water lines, preventing injection of water
into the reactor. The reactor pressure vessel, its
internals and instrumentation are thus protected
against corrosive chlorides. The protective signal
activates when two measurement points indicate
an excessive value. According to the Technical
Specifications, the four measurement functions
must be operational during plant unit operation.
In this situation the operative state of the signal
depended on two conductivity measurements.
Electrical connectors had been detached since
an annual maintenance outage that ended on 21
May 2001. In the outage the conductivity meas-
urements were calibrated prior to which their
electrical connectors had to be disconnected. After-
wards the connectors were not restored to opera-
tion by mistake. Their disconnected state had been
entered in an unofficial checklist but the short-
coming went unnoticed until an inspection that
was conducted before the plant unit’s start-up.
Because of the event, procedures will be re-
vised to prevent recurrence. Connector inspec-
tions, among others, will be included as an entry
in the instructions for relay cubicle inspections;
and post-calibration operation of the conductivity
measurements will be assured using a computer
trend display.
The event was classified INES Level 0.
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Loviisa power plant
The main circulation pump sealing water
system was improved
In the 2001 annual maintenance outages of both
Loviisa plant units improvements were made to
the sealing water system of the main circulation
pumps to assure system operation in transients
and accidents. The same improvements at Loviisa
2 were due in the 2000 refuelling outage already
but were postponed because of a delay in the han-
dling of documents relating to the modification
(STUK-B-YTO 208, 2001).
The mechanical seals of the main circulation
pumps require continuous cooling and could sus-
tain damage if left without cooling for several
hours, in consequence of which a minor leak from
the primary circuit could occur. The importance of
sealing water supply and the need to improve it
has been identified on the basis of the results of
probabilistic safety analyses, among others.
During normal operation the seals are cooled
by primary circuit water that, for its part, is cooled
by intermediate cooling system water. The inter-
mediate cooling system is cooled by the service
water system. The improvements make it possible
to cool the seals with boron system water. Boron
system water need not be separately cooled since
it is cold enough as such. After the modification,
the supply of sealing water automatically reverses
to take place from the boron system in case
sealing water temperature exceeds 50°C. At the
same time, normal sealing water supply from the
primary circuit purification system is automatical-
ly prevented to isolate a possible sealing water
system leak. The mechanical seals of the main
circulation pumps withstand temperatures of 70–
80°C. The improvements also include modifica-
tions to the protection and control systems and
new temperature measurements.
The improvements ensure the operation of the
seals not only in case normal sealing water system
cooling is lost but also in case of system pipe
breaks. The isolation of leaks from the sealing
water system will be further assured in the 2002
annual maintenance.
Reduction of risks from containment
external leaks
Modifications have been made at both Loviisa
plant units to reduce the risk of leaks from the
primary circuit to outside the containment
through various systems. The need for modifica-
tions has surfaced during the updating of the plant
units’ probabilistic safety analysis. In connection
with the updating, the licencee assesses the routes
and consequences of the leaks, among others. The
most important risk factors include, among others,
leaking valves in the drainage and venting sys-
tems relating to the reactor cooling system and
also elevated temperatures and moisture contents
caused by steam releases in transmitter rooms lo-
cated in the ground floor of the reactor building.
Temperature increases and moisture could bring
about malfunctions in instrumentation.
During the 2001 annual maintenance outages,
an isolation valve was added to the reactor build-
ing drainage system and the connection between
the reactor building venting system and the dis-
charge line was removed. The modification re-
duced the likelihood of leaks external to the con-
tainment through the venting and drainage sys-
tems. In addition, the utility made more specific
plant instructions for the management of minor
leaks from the primary circuit as regards the
detection and isolation of leaks external to the
containment building.
To reduce the risk of leaks external to the
containment, the plant units will also make other
modifications whose implementation schedule
STUK has approved.
Operational parameters of emergency
cooling system water tanks were changed
The operational parameters of the hydroaccumu-
lators of the reactor emergency cooling systems
were changed at both plant units in the 2001 an-
nual maintenance outages. The change in opera-
tional parameters meant an enlargement in the
water volume of the pressurised water tanks and a
reduction in their original operating pressures.
The modifications improve reactor core cooling in
the event of primary circuit leaks. Consequently, a
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12.5% increase in maximum fuel burn-up became
possible (see subsection 4.1.4).
The modification is part of a more extensive
emergency cooling system upgrading, approved in
1999. During those improvements, the cooling
function will be optimised and the low pressure
emergency coolant pumps replaced. Some of the
pump replacements were made in 2000.
Modernisation of the fire detection system
Fire detection system replacement was completed
at Loviisa power plant in autumn 2001. The sys-
tem was replaced because it no longer met today’s
requirements for operation and reliability. In addi-
tion, obtaining spare parts for the system had be-
come difficult.
The new fire detection system was constructed
parallel with the operating system, which was
removed from service after the new system was
completed. The new system has sensitive, address-
able fire detectors providing early detection and
making possible the identification of fire location
to a single detector. All this advances the starting
of automatic extinguisher systems and the initia-
tion of operative fire fighting measures. In addi-
tion, proper detectors for each room are selected to
minimise false alarms. Data from the fire detec-
tion centre is transferred into a graphics system
functioning as an alarm-receiving user interface.
By the interface, the fire detection system can be
controlled and system event data aggregated.
Renewal of hydrogen units
The location of hydrogen units at Loviisa plant
was changed and the units were replaced. They
were moved from the outer wall of the turbine
buildings to about five meters’ distance from the
buildings.
The generators of Loviisa plant are cooled by
hydrogen because it has good heat transfer prop-
erties. A constant volume of hydrogen circulates in
the generators and more is taken from the hydro-
gen units, if necessary. A hydrogen leak at the
Loviisa 2 hydrogen unit in 1999 (STUK-B-YTO
202, 2000) initiated the renewal of the units. After
the event the utility assessed the technical reali-
sation of the units, their operational safety and
the correctness of maintenance measures. In the
old units, also the signs of ageing were observed.
Both hydrogen units comprise eight hydrogen
bottles. The bottles were placed in bunkers specifi-
cally built for them, made of reinforced concrete
and open on one side. The walls of the bunkers
would protect the adjacent buildings from the
pressure that would develop in a potential hydro-
gen explosion. In addition, the developing pres-
sure would be channelled by the open wall of the
bunkers to a direction where there are no struc-
tures or buildings that could sustain damage.
Renewal of the electric motors of pumps of
the Loviisa 2 service water system
Power analyses relating to the electric motors of
the pumps of the plant’s service water system per-
formed in connection with the Loviisa 2 moderni-
sation project indicated that the operating capa-
bility of the motors in undervoltage situations had
to be increased. The main function of the service
water system is to assure, under all plant unit
operational conditions, the reliable and sufficient
supply of cooling water to the heat exchangers of
several systems important to safety, and to redi-
rect warm water from the heat exchangers back to
the sea.
On the basis of the results of the analyses the
licencee decided to modernise all motors of the
service water systems and their reserve motor.
The motors are original components. Modernisa-
tion was carried out by rewinding them. The
rewinding was begun in spring 2001 and was
continued such that the last rewound motor was
taken into service in the Loviisa 2 annual mainte-
nance outage. The rewinding of the reserve motor
was completed towards the end of the year.
The bearing of the first rewound motor was
damaged in August, after having been in opera-
tion for about five months. The damage was attrib-
uted to lack of lubricant. The motor’s bearing and
shaft were changed and the motor was serviced.
No corresponding problems appeared in other mo-
tors.
The power requirement and capacity of
Loviisa 1’s corresponding pump motors in under-
voltage situations has also been examined. The
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results indicate that the capacity of the pump
motors in service at Loviisa 1 is sufficient for the
time being and there is no need to rewind them.
The Loviisa 1 pumps are smaller than those of
Loviisa 2 are.
Re-coating of Loviisa 1 steam generator
room floor
During the 2000 annual maintenance a water leak
had occurred at the plant unit in consequence of
which the floor coating came off in several places
(STUK-B-YTO 208, 2001). The floor was temporar-
ily repaired by removing loose coating sections and
by applying a new layer of coating on the bare
concrete floor. Final coating work was scheduled
for forthcoming annual maintenance. During the
2001 annual maintenance outage, about one fifth
of the floor area was coated. Old coating was re-
moved insofar as it was not firmly “bound” to the
base. Work proceeded as planned and the worker
radiation doses were noticeably lower than as-
sessed prior to the work.
The coating work will continue in forthcoming
annual maintenances and the floor re-coating job
is due for completion in 2005. In a possible leak
situation, the coating prevents water and any
radioactive substances in it from being absorbed
into the floor concrete. The radioactive substances
in the concrete could add to the radiation exposure
of workers even after the leak situation. Owing to
the coating, which is even decontaminable, leak
waters end up in the radioactive water treatment
system.
Olkiluoto power plant
Plant modifications providing against
accidents
In the annual maintenance outages of both
Olkiluoto plant units modifications were made to
provide against severe accidents. The most time-
consuming of them was the strengthening of an
Olkiluoto 1 containment building personnel lock.
The modified containment withstands considera-
bly heavier individual pressure shocks than be-
fore. Such shocks could occur in a severe accident
during which the reactor core would melt and the
molten core would penetrate the reactor pressure
vessel and enter the water pool in the contain-
ment drywell. Under certain circumstances, when
molten fuel comes into contact with water, a
“steam explosion” could be generated. At Olkiluoto
2 the modification is due in 2002.
Another significant modification was the in-
stallation of a new lye tank at the water supply
system. Lye can be channelled from the tank to
the containment to regulate the pH of water in the
containment in such a way that any iodine acci-
dentally released would be contained as efficiently
as possible. The tank is shared by the two plant
units.
The need to install the lye tank to improve
iodine retention was demonstrated in a study
commissioned to the Technical Research Centre of
Finland (VTT) by STUK. The study examined the
behaviour of iodine in accident situations at
Olkiluoto facility. It experimentally demonstrated
that unless the pH of the containment building
water pools is regulated, i.a. by lye addition, acidi-
fication of the water could result. A significant
part of the iodine released within the containment
would then gasify and could form organic com-
pounds that would not be efficiently retained in
the filter of the containment filtered relief system.
The plant modification designed by the licencee
aims at preventing the creation of such unfavour-
able circumstances.
Renewal of the reactor control rod
manoeuvring and position indication system
of Olkiluoto 2
Olkiluoto 2 systems for the control and position
indication of reactor control rods were renewed
during annual maintenance. The most part of the
position indication system was replaced. Included
in the system were selection functions for the con-
trol rods to be manoeuvred and the collection of
manoeuvring data. Control rod control was thus
made more accurate and rod position data report-
ing and tests were enhanced
The control rod manoeuvring and position indi-
cation system collects and transmits data on rod
positions in the reactor to the operator and the
plant unit’s process computer system. The new
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system’s data processors generate also signals
indicating the rods to be manoeuvred for trans-
mission to the control rod manoeuvring system.
The selection signals used to be generated by
process computer.
The system generates manoeuvring signals for
the reactor’s 121 control rods by combining selec-
tion signals coming from the position control sys-
tem with manoeuvring signals initiated by the
operator. In addition, the system transmits protec-
tion signals generated by safety systems or initiat-
ed by the operator to shut down the reactor or to
limit reactor power.
The power supply components of control rod
drive motors at the switchgear plant were re-
placed. The contactor switching on the control rod
withdrawal function was doubled in series, which
reduced the probability of erroneous withdrawal
due to contactor failure. System monitoring for
unnecessary rod withdrawals caused by internal
faults in the control rod manoeuvring system was
improved at the same time.
The rod local manoeuvring system in the in-
strumentation rooms near the control room was
extended to comprise four control posts, whereas
the old system had two. The selection of locally
manoeuvred control rods was renewed as well and
is now carried out on a programmable user inter-
face belonging to the rod position indication sys-
tem.
The renewal of the rod manoeuvring and posi-
tion indication system at Olkiluoto 1 is due for
implementation in the 2002 annual maintenance.
During the functional testing and commission-
ing of the renewed systems some unnecessary
failure signals and erroneous measurement data
was observed by the licencee. In addition, control
rod selection failed in some special situations. The
failures were mainly attributed to the electrical
connections of different system parts, which were
not compatible in all situations. The failures hav-
ing the most bearing on operation have been fixed
by software modifications and a repair schedule
for the rest has been set by the utility.
Renewal of the measurement computer
systems of the Olkiluoto plant units
The Olkiluoto 2 measurement computer system
was renewed in the 2001 annual maintenance out-
age. It comprises equipment facilitating the work
of the operating and maintenance personnel in
monitoring and clarifying the course of transients
at the plant units as well as making possible the
analysis of gathered data.
The old system has been on normal standby
and, on specific alarm signals, has started the
collection of data on important plant unit parame-
ters during transients. It has also recorded plant
unit operation in special situations, such as impor-
tant tests. The plant unit has renewed the sys-
tem’s data gathering and processing equipment to
improve availability and maintainability. A corre-
sponding modification was made at Olkiluoto 1 in
the 2000 annual maintenance.
The new system collects measurement data by
programmable processors and it has considerably
more inputs than had the old system. In the new
system 416 analogue and 128 binary inputs can be
used. Data is transferred from processors to indi-
vidual workstations. They continuously gather
data so that their memory always contains one
week’s event history. Applicable analysis software
is available on the workstations for examination of
the measurement data.
Rotating converters replaced by UPS
equipment
A modification project was launched at the
Olkiluoto plant units during the 2001 annual
maintenance during which ageing direct/alternat-
ing current converters are replaced by modern
UPS equipment. A rotating converter unit com-
prises a direct-current motor rotating an alternat-
ing-current generator. The converter unit assures
electrical power supply to the battery-backed 400
volt alternating current system under all opera-
tional conditions of the plant units. Both Olkiluoto
plant units have four converters.
The converters were renewed owing to their
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increasing maintenance costs, inferior efficiency
and ageing-related malfunctions.
One new piece of UPS equipment was installed
and commissioned at Olkiluoto 1 and two at
Olkiluoto 2 during the 2001 annual maintenance
outages. The remaining five pieces of equipment
are due for installation in 2002.
Cathodic protection of service water
channels
An impressed current cathodic protection system
was installed at some points of the service water
tunnels at both Olkiluoto plant units for corrosion
control of reinforcement steels. This electro-chemi-
cal corrosion prevention method utilises an elec-
tric current to make metal surfaces immune to
corrosion. At the Olkiluoto plant units electric cur-
rent is fed from a direct-current supply to rein-
forcement steels via insoluble auxiliary anodes. In
addition, the system includes reference electrodes
controlling the operation of the direct-current
source.
The problem with concrete service water tun-
nels is that the salt in sea water migrates into the
concrete causing corrosion of the reinforcement
steels inside it. The service water of the Olkiluoto
plant units is channelled to turbine condensers
and to the service water tunnels of the auxiliary
building and back along tunnels partly built in
rock, partly in concrete.
The licencee plans to later extend cathodic
protection to cover all service water channels
made of concrete.
Modernisation of the fire detection system
The automatic fire detection system of the Olkiluo-
to power plant has been replaced. The old equip-
ment had aged and did not meet modern require-
ments on system operation and reliability. Spare
parts procurement had also become difficult.
The old system’s cabling was used to the extent
possible in constructing the new system. The old
system’s fire detection circuits were installed in
the new system one one by one. The basic technol-
ogy of the new system is similar to that of Loviisa
power plant’s fire detection system whose recon-
struction is described earlier in this Appendix.
